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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—St. Vincent of Lerins, *Commonit, c. 6.*

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MITHRAISM.*

It has become the vogue at the present day in rationalistic circles to view Christianity, and especially its oldest form, the Catholic Church, as a composite institution built up partly from Jewish, and largely from pagan elements. There is scarcely a religion of the past to which Christianity has not been declared a debtor. One of the favorite sources today from which Christianity is alleged to have drawn with a generous hand is Mithraism.

Mithraism is not to be confounded with Mazdaism, whether as practised by the great kings of ancient Persia, or as set forth in the sacred Iranian books that constitute the Avesta

* NOTE.—For the study of Mithraism in its various aspects, the following works may be consulted. The list is not exhaustive.

Franz Cumont, *Textes et Monuments Relatifs aux Mystères de Mithra.* 2 vols. 4to, Bruxelles, 1896-1899. To this great, authoritative work all students of Mithraism are indebted.

Les Mystères de Mithra, Paris, 2d ed., 1902, by the same author, is a rehearsing of the chief contents of volume 1 of the work just mentioned. There is an English translation by T. J. McCormack, *The Mysteries of Mithra,* Chicago, 1903.

A more recent work, also by Cumont, is *Les Religions Orientales dans le Paganisme Romain,* Paris, 1909; English translation, *The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism.* Chicago, 1911. Chapter VI gives an interesting account of Mithraism.

There are a number of excellent short treatises on Mithraism by other scholars. Among these may be mentioned J. Toutain, *Les Cultes Païens dans l'Empire Romain,* Paris, 1911, part I, vol. II, ch. 4; A. Gasquet,

(or Zend-Avesta). Mazdaism, of whose teachings and rites we have extensive and accurate knowledge, was a great national religion, which in its worship of the supreme god Ormazd, attained to a high level of religious and moral excellence. It was a near approach to monotheism, and deserves to rank first among all the religions of the pagan world. Mithraism on the other hand, was an heretical and more or less degenerate offshoot of Mazdaism transplanted in Phrygian soil, in which worship was centered not on Ormazd but on a deity honored in Mazdaism as one of Ormazd's heavenly creatures, Mithra, the ancient light-god, destined in this new cult to assume the position of supreme god and to be identified with the sun. This cult never attained to the dignity of a national religion, but wherever it thrived, was content to live in friendly rivalry with other pagan forms of worship. Of its rites and teachings, in great part, we have no certain knowledge, for they were hidden behind an impenetrable veil of secrecy, which was drawn aside only for the initiated, and which its worshippers were bound under solemn oath to keep closed from the rest of the world.

The mysteries of Mithra seem to have taken form in the third and second centuries before Christ, and to have spread rapidly over the eastern part of Asia Minor. Pontus, Cappadocia, Armenia, the mountainous regions of Cilicia as well as Commagene in Northern Syria presented a soil favorable to its growth. On the other hand, Greece and the adjacent islands, Palestine and the coast regions of Asia Minor were lands to which the Phrygian cult of Mithra remained forever a stranger.

Essai sur le Culte et les Mystères de Mithra, Paris, 1899; J. Réville, *La Religion à Rome sous les Sévères*, Paris, 1886; ch. 3; S. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, London, 1904, book IV, ch. 6; G. Wolff, *Über Mithrasdienst und Mithreen*, Frankfurt, 1909.

The following authors treat of Mithraism and Christianity: A. Harnack, *The Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*, N. Y., 1905, vol. II, p. 447 ff.; C. C. Martindale, S. J., article, *Mithra*, in vol. II of the *History of Religions*, St. Louis, 1910 (same treatise may be found in the *Month*, Oct.-Nov., 1908); A. D'Alès, *Mithriacisme et Christianisme*, in the *Revue Pratique d'Apologétique*, vol. III (1906-7), pp. 462 ff. and 519 ff.; J. Grill, *Die persische Mysterienreligion im römischen Reich und das Christentum*, Tübingen, 1903.

It was not so, however, for the Roman Empire of the West. Here Mithraism had a wide diffusion in the second and following centuries of the Christian era. According to Plutarch, the first knowledge which the Romans had of this oriental cult was derived from the pirates of Cilicia when, in the year 67 B. C., Pompey subdued them with a Roman fleet and put an end forever to their depredations on land and sea. In his life of Pompey, Plutarch tells of the havoc wrought by these murderous freebooters, and adds that they offered strange sacrifices and practised along with other secret cults the mysteries of Mithra, which still existed in his day, having been first made known by them.[1]

The first positive evidence we have of the presence of Mithraism in the West is an inscription of a freedman in the household of one of the Flavian emperors, and hence dating somewhere in the years 70-96 A. D. It was most likely in the latter part of the reign of Vespasian (69-79) or in the short reign of Titus (79-81) that the cult of Mithra made its way to Rome, being brought there by captives and slaves from Commagene and lesser Armenia after the conquest of these countries by Vespasian. To quote Cumont, *The Mysteries of*

[1] Some scholars on the basis of this passage of Plutarch assert that Mithraism was introduced at this time into Italy. So Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, 1899, p. 78. But Plutarch's words tell, not of an initiation of Romans into the Mithraic Mysteries, but rather of their earliest knowledge of the cult. It is hard to see how an obscure cult practised by a detested community of outlaws could have had any attraction for their Roman conquerors. Pompey may have brought some of these pirates with him to Italy, just as he transported Jewish captives after the taking of Jerusalem in 63 B. C., but of this we have no positive evidence. Cumont thinks it possible that in this manner a few oriental Mithra-worshippers found their way to Rome in Pompey's time. Be this as it may, Mithraism could not have thrived at this early period on account of the distrust and bittter opposition which the Roman Senate showed towards oriental cults. This intolerance was not relaxed till the time of Claudius. Cumont does not hesitate to say that such Mithra-worship as may have existed towards the end of the Republic was insignificant. "The influence of this small band of votaries on the great mass of the Roman population was virtually as infinitesimal as is today the influence of Buddhistical societies on modern Europe." *The Mysteries of Mithra*, 1903, p. 37.

Mithra, p. 36:—"Not till then were regular and immediate relations established between these remote countries and the Occident. The exigencies of administration and the organization of defence, the changing of governors and officers, the relieving of procurators and revenue officers, the levies of troops of infantry and cavalry, and finally the permanent establishment of three legions along the frontier of the Euphrates, provoked a perpetual interchange of men, products, and ideas between these mountainous districts hitherto closed to the world and the European provinces. Then came the great expeditions of Trajan, of Lucius Verus, of Septimus Severus. . . . These successive annexations of the Cæsars were the first cause of the diffusion of the Mithraic religion in the Latin world. It began to spread there under the Flavians, and developed under the Antonines and the Severi, just as did another cult practised alongside of it in Commagene, namely that of Jupiter Dolichenus, which made at the same time the tour of the Roman empire."

During the latter part of the first century and the first quarter of the second, Mithraism existed obscurely in Rome, maintained by foreign slaves and freedmen. Then it began to find favor with some of the Roman citizens, and soon won a respectful recognition from the state. Antoninus Pius (138-161) gave it the prestige of imperial favor by erecting a temple of Mithra in Ostia. Commodus (180-192) showed his devotion to the Phrygian light-god by being initiated into the Mithraic mysteries. Doubtless many obsequious courtiers hastened to imitate him and thereby increase the number of Mithra's worshippers. From that time on, Mithraism had in Rome a respectable standing and numbered among its votaries a fair proportion of men of distinguished families. Even in the latter part of the fourth century, when paganism in Rome was steadily declining, we find Mithraic inscriptions bearing the names of the high born and wealthy.

But it was in not Rome or in Italy that Mithraism had its largest number of adherents. The most numerous traces of its existence have been left along the old line of fortifications that

formerly stood as a barrier against barbarian invasions and marked the northern boundaries of the empire in Europe. This line, roughly speaking, followed the Danube and the Rhine, and in the island of Britain was fixed by the wall of Hadrian. It is along these immense stretches of land, in ancient Moesia, Dacia, Pannonia, Noricum, Rhenish Germany, and the northern limit of Britain that Mithraic remains most abound. The reason for this is not far to seek. Mithraism was first and foremost a military cult, brought to these regions by foreign Mithra-worshippers, who along with other orientals were enlisted in the Roman army and stationed in the numerous camps that dotted the extensive frontier on the North.[2] Some of the Roman soldiers, even centurions and higher officers, became initiated in the mysteries of the victorious light-god, and when afterwards they were sent to different parts of the empire, or made their way thither after being honorably discharged, they brought with them the devotion to the god in whom they recognized a benevolent and powerful protector. Again, not a few of the slaves imported from Asia Minor after the time of Vespasian were devoted to Mithra. Through them Mithra-worship was carried to many of the seaports of the Mediterranean, up along the Rhone, over Northern Italy, into Dalmatia and other neighboring countries, where many of them worked in mines and quarries, or served as scribes and subordinate officials in municipal and government service. It was thus a foreign cult, diffused chiefly by foreign soldiers, slaves and freedmen. But it also attracted to its temples native born Romans, including some of high rank. In the Mithraic inscriptions are to be found names of governors of provinces, prefects, legates, tribunes, though the names of the lowly are by far more numerous. Nor were Antoninus Pius and Commodus the only emperors who fostered the cult of Mithra. An inscription found in the ruins of a Mithraic temple a few miles below Vienna, on the site of ancient Carnuntum, records that Diocletian and his associates, namely Galerius and Licinius,

[2] The policy of recruiting large divisions of the Roman army with Orientals seems to have been first adopted by Vespasian.

who were in Carnuntum in the year 307, restored a temple to Mithra as patron of the empire, *fautori imperii sui.*

What was the character of this oriental cult which became so widespread in the Western Empire? It is to this question that we shall now turn our attention.

The deity who was the chief object of worship and from whom the cult took its name was Mithra. In the religion of the Avesta, and in the closely related religion of the Great Kings of ancient Persia, Mithra was a light-god, one of the numerous resplendent deities created by the supreme god Ormazd for the purpose of warring with the evil spirits of darkness. The origin of this deity goes back to the remote age when the ancient Iranians and the ancient Hindus formed one people and had a common religion; for the sacred Vedas tell of Mithra, god of light and friend of man, whose eye is the sun, and who sees and punishes all wrong-doing. In the Avesta, Mithra is venerated as one of the most powerful of Ormazd's heavenly assistants. He is closely associated, but not identified, with the sun. As light, he is everywhere present and nothing escapes his notice. He is "the sleepless one," "the Lord of vast lands, with a thousand ears and ten thousand eyes." He is the dreaded avenger of lying, deceit, and the breaking of contracts. He is the friend and benefactor of all who observe the holy law of Ormazd, bringing health, abundance, success, happiness and peace of conscience. As god of light dispersing the powers of darkness he is an invincible conqueror, protecting the faithful who call on him in battle, cutting down the ranks of the foes and putting them to flight.

It is easy to see how the Great Kings of Persia, while worshipping Ormazd as supreme god, had a special devotion for Mithra as the truth-loving and invincible god of victory. A prayer of Artaxerxes Mnemon (404-361 B. C.), chiseled on the ruins of his palace at Susa runs:—"May Ormazd, Anahita, and Mithra protect me." As early at least as the sixth century B. C., the name Mithradates (gift of Mithra) was borne by many of the noblest sons of Iran. The seventh month of the Persian year, corresponding to September 15-October 15, was called the month Mithra or Mihr, and the sixteenth day of this

month, the day Mihr, was held in greatest veneration. It was the popular belief that on this day the sun first appeared. On this day was celebrated the most popular festival of the year, the so-called Mithrakana, or Mihragan. So deeply rooted was this festival in the life of the people that long after the Sassanian Empire of Persia had been overthrown, it continued to be observed even by the Arab conquerors, and did not fall into disuse till the eleventh century.

In Mithraism, under Phrygian and Babylonian influences, ancient Mazdaism was changed into a form of heresy that the pious Zoroastrian could not but abominate. The supreme god Ormazd and most of his heavenly co-workers faded from view. Mithra, now identified by the great majority of his votaries with the sun, became the chief object of worship. About this mythical personage was clustered a cycle of legends, of which unfortunately no written account has been preserved. They are depicted in part in rudely sculptured scenes which the scattered monuments of Mithraism have brought to light. Cumont has attempted to reconstruct the story from these pictorial fragments, but the data are in part too scanty and too obscure to allow more than a conjectural interpretation.[3] His birth was miraculous. He sprang from a rock, a myth doubtless suggested by the rising of the sun from behind the rocky mountains of Phrygia.[4] Like another Moses, he caused water to gush from a rock by shooting an arrow against it. Like another Hercules he was the hero of mighty deeds. A scene depicts him half dragging, half-carrying a bull, whose hind legs he holds over his shoulders while its huge body hangs head downwards behind him. But the all-important scene in this sacred drama is his slaying of the mythical bull, from whose quickening blood was fabled to have sprung every form of animal and vegetable life.[5] This scene, reproduced with

[3] Cumont admits this himself. Cf. *Textes et Monuments Relatifs aux Mystères de Mithra*, 1896, II, p. 304, note 3.

[4] Justin Martyr mentions this feature of the Mithra-legend in his *Dialogue with Trypho*, ch. 70.

[5] This seems to be a modification of the Zoroastrian legend, according to which the primitive bull, created by Ormazd and wickedly slain by

little variation, was sculptured in low relief and given the chief place of honor in every Mithraic temple. The god in the form of a beardless youth, wearing the Phrygian cap, with his short tunic floating behind in the breeze, has his left knee pressed firmly on the back of the bull, which has been thrown to the ground in the very act of running. With his left hand clenched about its nostrils, he draws its head tightly back, while with his right hand he plunges a knife deep into its heart. From the wound flows a stream of blood at which a serpent and a dog are leaping, eager to taste its quickening essence. Two diminutive youths, resembling the god in features and in costume, stand close by in an attitude of repose, the one with an upright torch, the other with torch inverted, symbolic it would seem of the rising and the setting sun.

Such was the deity to whom the Mithraists looked as their chief god and protector—the radiant god of light, identified for the most part with the sun, to whose beneficence the earth owes its fertility and becomes a goodly habitation for man. Various are the epithets applied to him in the inscriptions that have come down to us. We find dedications to "the omnipotent god Mithra," (omnipotenti deo Mithræ), to "the holy god Mithra," (deo sancto Mithræ), but most commonly of all, to "the invincible sun Mithra," (soli invicto Mithræ). This was the favorite epithet applied to him by his military votaries, who venerated him especially as the victorious god of battle.[6]

The religion of Zoroaster, the form of Mazdaism that is best known, recognized in the material and spiritual world a sharply defined dualism. Ormazd was the creator of all that was good,

the evil spirit Ahriman, became the source of all animals and plants belonging to the good creation. Cf. Darmesteter, *Zend-Avesta*, 1892, I, p. 316, and II, pp. 181, 285, 309. It is also taught in the *Bundahish*, XXX, 25, that on the day of the general resurrection, at the end of the world, a giant bull, now carefully guarded in a remote and inaccessible enclosure, will be slain in sacrifice, and its fat, mingled with the sacred Haoma, will confer immortality on all who shall be privileged to taste it. Cf. Darmesteter, *op. cit.*, II, p. 309.

[6] Invictus was not an exclusive title of Mithra. We find it given also to the sun-god of the cult set up by Aurelian, as well as to Mars, Hercules, and even Isis.

—the divine beings that aided him, heaven, earth, water, fire, and all beneficial animals and plants, as well as man. But the defects in nature,—severe cold, drought, disease, death, noxious animals and plants,—the wicked spirits also,—these were the creation of the malignant spirit Ahriman. Between these two armies was a bitter, unceasing warfare, which centered chiefly about man. It was the duty of man to live according to the holy law of Ormazd and thereby aid in repressing the powers of evil. After death, the good mounted to the bright home of Ormazd above, while the wicked were thrust into the dark hell of Ahriman. But the powers of evil were destined at last to come to naught. The world would be renovated, and faithful would rise again with immortal bodies.

How much of this teaching was retained in the heretical cult of Mithra? A definite answer is hard to give, for on these points the inscriptions tell us next to nothing, and we have no authentic written documents.[7] It is generally taken for granted that the Mazdean dualism in its main outlines passed over into Mithraism. We may note, however, that in one respect, at least, Mithraic dualism ran counter to Zoroastrian belief and practise. Among the evil animals created by Ahriman and abhorred by the Zoroastrian were the lion and the serpent. But to the Mithraist these animals gave no cause for repugnance. One of the subsidiary statues in many Mithraic temples was a grim monster, which Cumont conjectures to have been Zervan-Kronos, the personification of Boundless Time, but which may have been a fire-deity. It is a male figure with the head of a snarling lion, about whose human body is coiled a serpent, while its head rests on the shaggy head of the god. This would have been an abomination according to the religion of the Avesta.[8]

Again anything like a compounding with the evil spirit would

[7] Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, 1903, claims to have brought to notice an original and authentic description of Mithraic ceremonies, which, if truly portrayed descend to the level of buffoonery. Its authenticity, however, is contested. It throws little light on Mithraic teachings. Cf. Cumont, *Oriental Religions*, p. 260.

[8] Cf. *Mysteries of Mithra*, p. 105.

have shocked the Zoroastrian as an unpardonable sin. But if we may trust Cumont, the Mithraist sought by offerings to allay the malignity of Ahriman, to whom homage was paid as "lord of the underworld and master of the infernal spirits," to whom as *deo Arimanio* we find several dedication in the inscriptions.[9]

On the other hand the Mazdean doctrine of future retribution seems to have been retained by the Mithraists with little change. Tertullian mentions that the worshippers of Mithra looked forward to a bodily resurrection. On the basis of a statement of Celsus,[10] Cumont attributes to Mithraic belief an embellishment on the earlier doctrine of souls. The souls of men pre-existed in heaven. As the time approached for their union with a human body, they descended by a series of gradations through the sun, moon and the five planets, acquiring from each the dispositions and passions that were to determine their character on earth. After death, if their good deeds and religious acts were such as to merit a favorable judgment, they mounted in inverse order from planet to planet, leaving with each the characteristics it had received, till it finally reached heaven purified of all defects.

The Mithraic doctrine of souls and of individual destiny was distorted and vitiated by the superstitions of astrology, the fruit apparently of Chaldean influence. One of the inscriptions names a Mithraic priest who was an astrologist.[11] The sculptured monuments of the temples abound in astronomical symbols,—the sun with his quadriga, the moon with the crescent, the other five planets, and the signs of the zodiac. Cumont recognizes this element to be one of the dark blots on Mithraism, which, he says, "is partly responsible for the triumph in the West of this pseudo-science with its long train of errors and terrors.[12]

[9] Cumont, *Textes et Monuments*, I, p. 139 also *Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism*, 1911, p. 153.

[10] Cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, VI, ch. 21 and 22. Cumont has an interesting note on this subject in his *Oriental Religions*, p. 269, n. 54.

[11] Cf. *Textes et Mon.*, II, p. 126, Inscr. 192.

[12] *Myst. of Mithra*, p. 125, *Textes et Mon.*, I, p. 301

To attain to a life of happiness in heaven, the rites proper to Mithraism were held to be of exceptional efficacy and importance. These sacred rites were hidden from the profane by a veil of secrecy, the observance of which was made binding on every initiate by a most solemn oath. They were performed, not in stately temples open to the sky, but in caves hollowed out of the solid rock, or in subterranean crypts so built as to exclude the light of day. One descended by a flight of steps to a vestibule, which in turn opened into the temple proper, sometimes on a still lower level. The rectangular interior, lighted by lamps, had at its further end a raised apse, separated from the entrance by a long troughlike depression flanked on either side by a raised aisle. On the wall of the apse, in full view of the worshipper as he entered, was the most conspicuous object in the temple, the sculptured scene of Mithra slaying the bull. Below this scene was an altar on which a fire was kept perpetually burning. Statues of other deities were disposed along the sides and near the entrance.

We know from Justin Martyr [13] and from Tertullian [14] that a sacred banquet formed part of the worship, at which an offering of bread and water—the counterpart, doubtless, of the Persian Haoma sacrifice—was offered to Mithra. According to Cumont, wine was mingled with the water as a substitute for the exhilarating juice of the Haoma-plant; but this is mere conjecture, resting on the slender evidence of three sculptured scenes in which the grape is associated with Mithra and the god Bacchus.[15] Sacrifices of bulls seem also to have figured at times in the liturgy.[16]

[13] *Apology*, ch. 66.

[14] *Praescript.*, ch. 40.

[15] Cf. *Textes et Mon.* I, pp. 320, 146-7; II, pp. 231, 365 and plate viii, 513 and plate ix. Cf. also *Myst. of Mithra*, p. 131.

[16] Socrates. *Eccles. Hist.* III, ch. 2, relates that in the ruins of the mithræum in Alexandria, human bones and skulls were found, the remains of unfortunate victims immolated in the worship of Mithra. Most scholars, however, reject this statement as an error. Lampridus, in his life of Commodus, says that the emperor desecrated the Mithraic mysteries by slaying a man who was being initiated. Human sacrifice thus seems to have formed no part of Mithraic worship.

Participation in these mysteries was denied to women, and was allowed to men only after a series of secret initiation rites, for which, as in the mysteries of Isis, fees were probably exacted. The ceremonies of initiation called for a more than ordinary amount of courage and physical endurance. The candidate had to pass through severe and terrifying ordeals, in which the chief scenes in the legendary story of Mithra were vividly depicted before him, culminating doubtless in the slaying of a bull. As in the mysteries of Isis and of other rival cults, the initiation was preceded by a period of fasting and by a purificatory bath, a sort of baptism.

In Mithraism there were seven grades of initiation, like the ascending scale of degrees existing in secret societies of our day. St. Jerome enumerates them in his letter (107) to Laeta, and his statement is confirmed by indications found in the inscriptions. The initiate, according to the grade to which he belonged, was known as Raven, Cryptic (cryphius), Soldier, Lion, Persian, Sun-runner (Heliodromus), and Father. In their secret ceremonies, it was the rule for the members to wear masks indicative of their respective grades and, if we may trust the statement of an early Christian writer, to act in imitation of the animals whose names they bore. "Some flap their wings imitating the cawing of crows; others growl like lions. . . . In such ways are those who call themselves wise, coarsely made the object of ridicule." [17] There is extant a rudely carved scene in which are depicted four attendants officiating at a sacred meal of bread and water. Two of them are dressed as Persian and Soldier, while the other two wear the masks of Raven and Lion. In the ceremony of reception into the grade of Soldier, there was a signing of the forehead, which Tertullian mentions as an imitation through diabolical suggestion of a Christian rite, namely Confirmation. Cumont is of the opinion that the "sign or seal impressed was not, as in the Christian liturgy, an unction, but a mark burned

[17] Pseudo-Augustinus, *Quaest. Vet. et Novi Test.*, cited in Cumont, *Textes et Mon.*, II, p. 8.

with a red hot iron, like that applied in the army to recruits before they were admitted to the oath.[18]

Tertullian gives another interesting feature of the reception rite of the Soldier. A crown supported on the tip of a sword, after a mock threat of death, was set on the head of the candidate, whereupon, acting according to instruction, he brushed it quickly aside so that it fell on his shoulder, saying: "Mithra is my crown." Ever after, he abstained from wearing a wreath of flowers, and his refusal to make use of it, together with the statement that his god was his crown, was a sign that he was a votary of Mithra.[19]

In the initiation rite of the grade of Lion, there was a purification by means of honey.

Some writers, as Gasquet,[20] Réville,[21] Dill,[22] and others, think that the Mithraic worship, at least in its palmy period, included the rite of purification known as the taurobolium. Prudentius has given a description of this bloody and repulsive rite which to the pagan mind was a quasi-sacramental baptism.[23] The recipient stood in a deep trench covered above by a wooden floor pierced with holes or made in the form of lattice-work. Above, with great pomp and ceremony, a bull was slain so that its blood, heavily dripping through the perforated floor drenched the worshipper below. By this bloody baptism the recipient was thought to be washed of all guilt and to be made worthy of a happy eternity in heaven. Hence the favorite expression in the inscriptions, borrowed perhaps from Christian terminology, *renatus in aeternum.* This strange rite, to which scholars assign a Phrygian origin, seems to have been brought to the West in the second century, towards the close of Hadrian's reign. It became one of the most imposing and popular rites in the mysteries of the Great Mother Cybele. It might easily have fitted into the liturgy of Mithraism as a

[18] *Myst. of Mithra,* p. 157.
[19] *De Corona,* ch. 15.
[20] *Culte et Myst. de Mithra,* p. 75.
[21] *Religion sous les Sévères,* p. 96.
[22] *Rom. Society from Nero to M. Aurelius,* p. 589.
[23] *Peristeph.,* x.

sacramental repetition of the mythical slaying of the bull. But Cumont,[24] Toutain [25] and others maintain that at no time did the taurobolium form part of the Mithraic ritual. While this view seems to be better grounded, it is still true that the taurobolium was piously received by Mithraic worshippers, an indirect confession of uncertain faith in the all-sufficiency of their own rites.

Of the Mithraic priesthood, but little is known. The higher grades of initiates seem each to have had their respective priests, the highest in dignity being the priests of the grade of Fathers. They were presided over by a high priest, styled in the inscriptions Father of Fathers, *Pater Patrum,* or *Pater Patratus.*

Cumont and others have asserted that the cult of Mithra had its consecrated virgins and celibates. This is a mistake. As women were not allowed to take part in the mysteries of Mithra, there was no place in this oriental cult for consecrated virgins. Cumont himself states plainly that women were debarred from Mithraic worship and says:—"Among the hundreds of inscriptions that have come down to us, not one mentions either a priestess, a woman initiate, or even a donatress." [26] Nor is there good ground for associating with Mithraism the practise of celibacy. In the Eleusinian and the Isaic mysteries the observance of absolute continence was sought by some, but we are not warranted in saying the same of Mithraism. This alleged practise of virginity and of celibacy in Mithra worship is not supported by a single bit of evidence either in Mithraic inscriptions or in pagan writings. It rests solely on a misinterpreted passage in Tertullian's *Prescriptions.*[27]

[24] *Textes et Mon.*, I, p. 334, n. 5.

[25] *Op. cit.*, II, p. 138.

[26] *Myst. of Mithra,* p. 173. He seems, however, to have overlooked inscription no. 189, given in his *Textes et Mon.*, II, p. 126, where a dedication to Mithra is recorded of a certain Varia Severa. D(eo) [i(nvicto)] M(ithrae) Varia Q(uinti) f(ilia) Severa v(otum) s(olvit) l(ibens) m(erito). Persons not initiated in the mysteries sometimes made donations and dedications to Mithra.

[27] This passage, chapter 40, runs thus:—"The devil baptizes some, to wit, his own believers and followers; he promises the remission of sins by an ablution; and if my memory still serves me right, Mithra there puts

What was the moral worth of this strange mystic cult? Most scholars who have touched on this question have rated Mithraism very high. In its ethical precepts and its uplifting influence on heart and will, it is said to have surpassed the religions of Greece and Rome, if not of the whole pagan world.[28]

a mark on the forehead of his soldiers. He also celebrates an offering of bread, brings in a symbol of a resurrection, and wins a crown under a sword. And what shall we say of his (the devil's) restricting the high priest (summum pontificem) to one marriage? He, too (the devil), has his virgins and his celibates." Cumont, following Wissowa, takes these last two sentences to refer to Mithra; but D'Alès, *Mithraicisme et Christianisme, Rev. Pratique Apologetique*, III, p. 520, and others rightly insist that they refer to the more remote subject the devil. With this interpretation Harnack agrees, *Expansion of Christianity*, II, p. 450, note. The Mithraic high priest is never styled *summus pontifex* in the inscriptions. That Tertullian in these last two sentences is speaking, not of Mithra but of the devil, and that by *summus pontifex* he has in mind the Roman high priest, the *flamen dialis*, is made plain by other passages in which he uses similar language, referring to the devil. Take, for example, ch. 13 of his *Exhortation to Chastity*, which is practically a paraphrase of the sentences under consideration:—"The wife of a *flamen* must be but once married, which is the law of the *flamen* as well. For since the high priest (pontifex maximus) may not marry a second time, the first place of honor must be given to monogamy. Now when Satan shows a leaning to God's sacraments, it is a challenge for us; nay more, it puts us to the blush, if we are slow to give God an exercise of continence which some give the devil, now in perpetual virginity, now in perpetual widowhood. We have heard of Vesta's virgins and Juno's at the town of Achaia, and of Apollo's among the Delphians, and of Minerva's and Diana's in some places. We have heard, too, of continents, such as the priests of the well known Egyptian bull." Tertullian, in his anxiety to multiply instances of pagan chastity, would hardly have omitted to mention Mithra's virgins and continents, had such existed. See also ch. 7 of his treatise, *To his Wife*.

[28] "Of all the Oriental cults," says Cumont, *Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism*, 1911, p. 159, "none was so severe as Mithraism, none attained an equal moral elevation, none could have had so strong a hold on mind and heart." Cf. also his *Myst. of Mithra*, pp. 141, 143. Réville, *op. cit.*, p. 78, is of the same opinion. Toutain, *Les Cultes païens dans l'Empire Romain*, 1911, II, p. 130, says, "No pagan religion had ever given so high a place to moral conduct." Dill, *Roman Society*, p. 81, quotes with approval the sentence in Bigg's *Neoplatonism*, p. 56, "The religion of Mithra was the purest and most elevated of all non-Biblical religions." Wolff, *Über Mithrasdienst und Mithreen*, 1909, p. 24, expresses a similar view. According to Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, II, p. 221, Mithra was the "celestial incarnation of conscience."

But if we seek to know on what ground this almost unanimous praise is based, we are surprised to find that of positive evidence there is next to nothing. It rests on the unproved assumption that in the cult of Mithra was preserved unchanged the superior moral tone that characterized the religion of the Avesta. Cumont himself says:—"What were the obligations that Mithraism imposed upon his followers? What were those 'commandments' to which its adepts had to bow in order to be rewarded in the world to come? Our uncertitude on these points is extreme, for we have not the shadow of a right to identify the precepts revealed in the mysteries with those formulated in the Avesta. Nevertheless, it would appear certain that the ethics of the Magi of the Occident made no concession to the license of the Babylonian cults, and that it had still preserved the lofty character of the ethics of the ancient Persians." [29] The alleged moral superiority of Mithraism is thus little more than an assumption.

On the other hand, there are grounds to justify the suspicion that the moral excellence of Mithraism has been exaggerated and that such ethical teachings as it may have derived from Mazdaism were but feebly emphasized. Perhaps, not much should be made of the fact that the sacred mysteries were revealed to Commodus, one of the basest characters that ever disgraced a throne. This may have been due to an act of weakness on the part of the Mithraic priests. But if Mithraism was as stern as many scholars declare towards all forms of evil doing, it is hard to see how it could have been a favorite cult with the Cilician pirates, to whom pillage and murder were a daily occupation.

Moreover, there is another fact that does not tell in favor of the moral superiority of Mithraism. It is its intimate association with the rival cults of Cybele and of Hekate. With the mysteries of Cybele, the Great Mother, the Mithraic cult was united by the closest and friendliest ties, although the moral tone of this barbaric sect, with its bloody orgies, and its priesthood of self-mutilated Galli, was none too high. In Ostia

[29] *Myst. of Mithra*, p. 141.

and in Saalburg, the temples of Mithra and of Cybele stood side by side. Nor can this intimacy of the two cults be explained on the hypothesis that the wives of Mithra worshippers, being excluded from Mithraism, were led to resort to the Mysteries of Cybele. The very priests of Mithra prided themselves on having submitted to the taurobolium. They did not scruple to take part in the mysteries of the Great Mother, to mourn with her at the spring celebration over the death of her youthful lover Attis, and in turn to rejoice with her at his restoration to life.

Of Hekate, goddess of the lower world, whose circle of mystic worshippers included many votaries of Mithra, and whose sculptured images were commonly honored in Mithraic temples, Farnell says in his erudite work, *The Cults of the Greek States,* 1896, II, p. 502:—"There was, indeed, a certain part of the true Greek ritual that was tainted with magic, but no such atmosphere of evil and debased superstition gathered around any figure of the Hellenic religion as around Hekate." And on page 519, he ends the chapter on Hekate with these words:—"But neither as a goddess of marriage or birth or agriculture was Hekate of any real national importance in Greece; her worship was without morality, and displayed energy only in sorcery and imposture. It was one of the evil things that grew up into prominence with the decline of Hellenism." Association with such cults as these makes it at least doubtful if Mithraism itself stood on a much higher moral plane.

Did Mithraism arrive at a conception of monotheism that merits comparison with the Christian idea of the one supreme God? Or did it present any points of resemblance with Christianity of such character as to show an indebtedness of the religion of Christ to the cult of Mithra? These questions will be considered in a supplementary article to be printed in the next issue of the *Bulletin.*

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

THE GREEK VIEW OF THE RELATION BETWEEN POETRY AND MORALITY.

The intention of the present paper is not to determine the relationship which ought to exist between poetry and morality. That more ambitious theme must be left to the poets and philosophers themselves for settlement. A mere historian of language and literature is not qualified to enter the lists on either side of such a controversy, but must content himself with the more modest task of studying the views taken of this problem by the people with whose history he is engaged. To attempt this for the Greeks of the fifth century before Christ must be considered peculiarly appropriate, because their poetry formed the basis on which the philosophers first attacked the problem; while a special interest must also attach to the solution, because Greek literature is the fountainhead of modern literature, and whatever ideas were then held have conditioned, and are still conditioning, our own development.

The question at issue between the poets and philosophers may be put briefly as follows: Is poetry to be judged by an aesthetic or by an ethical standard? Or, restating the problem with more detail, we may ask: Has poetry an end, a purpose of its own, so distinct and independent that criticism must rest when it has determined, how and in what measure a given poem has fulfilled this end? Or, is the true end of poetry to subserve larger but more remote educational and moral purposes; so that criticism cannot stop without deciding, whether a given poem tends to make its hearers wiser and nobler men. The attitude of the Greeks towards these questions is a historical problem with two sides which it is important to keep separate. Of these the first is to determine the answers given to such questions by the philosophers of Greece. Difficult tho it be, this is the easier part of the problem, but it is also for the history of Greek literature the least important part. By the time of Plato and Aristotle the great days of Greek poetry were past.

Potent as the theories of these philosophers proved for Alexandria, Rome and the modern world, the classical poetry of Greece was already beyond their influence. How that poetry had been conditioned, what beliefs had been held by the great poets of Athens and by their audiences before the speculations of the philosophers began;—these are the questions which interest much more intensely the student of Greek literature. They indicate sufficiently the second side of the problem, the question of the popular attitude, the people's theory of the subject. Obviously something more vague, more intangible, more difficult to define—even had the sources of our knowledge flowed more freely than they actually do—it remains, nevertheless, for the historian of Greek literature the matter of greater interest. It is to it that I desire to direct attention, but the best approach is by way of the philosophical theories.

Unfortunately only a portion of Aristotle's treatise on the Art of Poetry has come down to us; and partly for this, partly for other reasons, his concept of the end of poetry is not stated so clearly as to put it beyond question. A reading of the *Poetics,* however, has convinced me that we must either regard its standard as aesthetic, or miss the meaning of the philosopher. The treatise opens by telling us that the various branches of poetry which are to receive consideration are all *mimeseis* or modes of imitation; that is they are to be classed under the category of *mimetic art,* the closest equivalent in Greek for our expression fine art. Here a definition of mimetic art is not given, but we should recall the passage in the *Metaphysics* (1. 1. 981b. 17) in which the useful and the fine arts are distinguished according to their ends; the purpose of the useful arts being to minister to some need, while the end of the mimetic arts is to afford us pleasure or rational enjoyment. From this distinction and the subsumption of poetry under the category of mimetic art, it follows that the ends of the various branches of poetry were regarded by Aristotle as different varieties of pleasure.

Passages in accordance with this conclusion occur throughout the *Poetics.* Thus we hear from Aristotle that Epos, Tragedy

and Comedy have each a pleasure peculiar to itself, and we are warned by him (1453b. 11; 1462b. 13) not to demand of one of them pleasure of any and every kind, but only its own appropriate pleasure. On this principle also (1453a. 35), Aristotle depreciates for Tragedy a certain form of plot, because it affords not the tragic pleasure, but pleasure of the kind which should be given by Comedy; and again (1459a. 21) he explains his reason for demanding unity in the Epic to be in order that the work may be able to afford its own appropriate pleasure. What these appropriate pleasures are, we should expect to learn from the definitions of the various branches of poetry. Of such definitions, however, we have but one (1449b. 24f.), and at the very point where we would learn from it, it is famous for the controversy it has provoked. It tells us that the end of Tragedy is the *katharsis* of pity and fear, but whether that means the purification or purgation of these emotions, has already taken volumes to determine, and the end is not yet. Into this question it is not necessary to go, except to the extent of saying that the *katharsis* must be some form of pleasure; both because pleasure is the end of all mimetic art, and because Aristotle elsewhere (1453b. 11) speaks of the end of Tragedy as being the pleasure which through *mimesis* may be derived from pity and fear.

Not only does Aristotle thus hold that the end of each branch of poetry is some peculiar form of pleasure, but he also names (1448b. 4f.) pleasure as one of the two sources to which ultimately the origin of poetry is to be traced. These are, according to him, the human instinct of imitation, and the fact that delight in the products of imitation is universal. It is equally significant to note, that Aristotle while keeping pleasure in view throughout the *Poetics,* never in that treatise regards any further end. Not once for instance does he demand that something be done or avoided, because it may improve or corrupt the spectator. As for didactic poetry, we may discover the philosopher's view from his remark (1447b. 17), that Empedocles is a physicist rather than a poet, that he has nothing in common with Homer except his meter. From these facts there can result for my mind but one conclusion, which may be

stated in the words of Mr. Butcher: Aristotle had "a clear conception of fine art as a free and independent activity of the mind, outside the domain both of religion and politics, having an end distinct from that of education or moral improvement."

This does not at all mean that questions of morality are entirely irrelevant in the criticism of poetry. For every man of right feeling the aesthetic ideal must contain certain moral elements; from what conforms to these elements he may receive pleasure, what disregards or flouts them is certain to cause him pain. The ethical ideal is thus always implicitly involved in the aesthetic standard; and to this extent, but only to this extent, does it affect Aristotle's theory of poetry. A poem would not be judged by him to be bad poetry because it would corrupt, but because the elements in it which tend to corruption would be offensive, repulsive, displeasing to the aesthetic taste of any man qualified to act as critic. For Aristotle the standard of poetry as poetry is in the last analysis always a question of pleasure or of pain. His method of thought may be illustrated from Cardinal Newman's criticism, which is thoroughly Aristotelian when he writes in *Poetry with Reference to Aristotle's Poetics* (*Essays Critical and Historical*, vol. II, p. 22): "The occasional irreligion of Virgil is painful . . . Lord Byron's Manfred is in parts intensely poetical; yet the delicate mind naturally shrinks . . ." and p. 16: "Lady Macbeth on the contrary is the conception of one deeply learned in the poetical art. She is polluted with the most heinous crimes, and meets the fate she deserves. Yet there is nothing in the picture to offend the taste . . . ." Such criticisms are not applying an ethical standard to poetry, they are only appreciating at their proper value the ethical elements which the aesthetic standard itself implies.

Some scholars to be sure would hold that there are in the *Poetics* passages in which Aristotle's criticism is affected by moral principles more fundamentally than could be accounted for by the considerations adduced in the last paragraph. In short, that there are passages in which his judgment is distinctly ethical. Before proceeding further I wish to review rapidly

these passages. In doing so it must be remembered that the question is not simply, whether Aristotle approves what is ethically good, and condemns what is ethically bad; in each case it is necessary to examine further and see whether the motives underlying his verdict are ethical or aesthetic.

In the first place Aristotle (1452b. 34) condemns any tragic plot, which shows either a good man falling from happiness to misery or a bad man rising out of misery to happiness. Neither condemnation, however, is made on the ground that such examples might have a bad moral effect. On the contrary, the first plot is rejected simply as being odious; the second, because it arouses neither fear nor pity—the emotions proper to Tragedy —nor even a feeling of commiseration. In the same breath moreover Aristotle condemns a form of plot, which the moralist would regard as an extremely salutary spectacle. The passage of an out-and-out villain from happiness to misery is, according to the philosopher, no subject for Tragedy; because, while we might commiserate such a man we could neither pity him, nor be inspired with fear by his fate. Secondly, Aristotle ranks (1453b. 26f.) the four forms of tragic plot in the following order of merit: (1) the deed of horror may be meditated in ignorance, but its execution prevented by a timely discovery; (2) the deed may be done in ignorance, the discovery coming too late; (3) the deed may be done with full knowledge; (4) the deed may be meditated with full knowledge but left undone. It has been claimed that this gradation is based not on the emotional but on the moral effect produced upon the spectator; some moral shock there must be, since Tragedy must center around some deed of horror, but Aristotle's wish is to minimize this shock as far as possible. The superiority of the two first plots lies, on the contrary, in the fact that they alone contain a discovery; the supremacy accorded them is to be explained on purely aesthetic reasons. That the philosopher's criticism here is not ethical, results also from the fact that on a moral basis the third form of plot must be ranked below the fourth. Finally, Aristotle demands (1454a. 16f.) that the characters of a tragedy be good; a demand which must be understood in the light of an earlier

statement (1453a. 7) that the tragic hero must not be pre-eminently virtuous, and a later passage (1461b. 19) which decries all needless exhibition of baseness. This demand, however, is not made of all poetry; it is, on the contrary, according to Aristotle, the province of Comedy to represent men, not altogether base, but still worse than the average. This passage consequently, has probably nothing to do with ethics, but merely contains a warning to Tragedy to remain in her own sphere. Even if taken as ethical the passage could prove nothing more than that Aristotle felt needless depiction of vice as offensive to good taste.

Looking back over these passages I can find in them nothing which should lead to a modification of the conclusion previously expressed. In the *Poetics* Aristotle has exercised the right to treat poetry in itself as poetry, without reference to the ideals of any other science, except in as far as they may be implied in the aesthetic ideal. To vindicate in this way an independent position for Aesthetics is one thing; to assert that Aesthetics is either the final or the sole judge of Art is another. The latter Aristotle did not do; the former he did, and did consciously, for he tells us (1460b. 13): "the standard of correctness is not the same in Politics and Poetics, nor is it the same in Poetics and any other art." To this I may add a passage in which Newman (*op. cit.*, p. 29) expands and illustrates this idea: "As the aim of civil government is the well-being of the governed, and its object is expediency; as the aim of oratory is to persuade, and its object is the probable; as the function of philosophy is to view all things in their mutual relations, and its object is truth; and as virtue consists in the observance of the moral law, and its object is the right; so Poetry may be considered to be the gift of moving the affections through the imagination, and its object to be the beautiful."

On turning from Aristotle to Plato we find a concept of the function of poetry which stands at the other pole. The difference too is one which at first sight seems to accord little with the characters of the two philosophers. The prosaic Aristotle is willing to consider poetry as it is, and hence is led to write

a theory of the art, a treatise on Poetics. Plato, the first prose poet of the world, one of the greatest of the poets of Greece. refuses to consider poetry except in its relation to education and government, and accordingly his treatment of the subject forms merely a part of the *Republic* and of the *Laws*. The explanation lies in the fact that Plato was only too keenly aware of the charm exercised upon him by poetry, while his philosophy compelled him to regard this charm as a dangerous fascination, as a struggle of the lower part of his soul to obtain the mastery, a struggle which must be controlled and subdued by reason. So, with the cry " Homer must not be set above truth " he turned from poetry as he knew it to the contemplation of poetry as he wished it to be. With the details of his conception of an ideal poetry in an ideal state, I have here nothing to do, my sole purpose being to consider the function of poetry as Plato conceived it. In this connection it is significant to note that he thinks it proper in seeking to determine the value of a poet to ask: what city has obtained a better constitution because it had Homer or some other poet as its lawgiver; what war was conducted better because of his advice; what useful idea or invention can be traced to him; what individuals did he educate. Such questions will prepare us for Plato's ultimate demand that the poet's work shall serve to instill and inculcate the beliefs and actions which the wisdom of the state has determined to be best, and has embodied as such in its laws. That virtue is happiness, that the same mode of life is at once the best and the sweetest, must be the burden of its teaching. It is to consist of hymns of praise and prayer to the gods, and of encomia on good men. These are to be composed and performed under the watchful supervision of the state with diction, harmony and rhythm of befitting austerity. To one accustomed to poetry as the world knows it, such poetry may seem unpleasing and cold, but this will not be the case for one educated under its influence. For him poetry as Plato would have it, will be no less pleasing, and it will possess the inestimable advantage of making its hearers better men. How far poetry is beneficial as inculcating wisdom and virtue is for Plato the supreme and sole test.

The next step must be to trace the elements of these theories beyond the philosophers who have thus formulated them, and again we may begin with Aristotle. To such an interpretation of the *Poetics* as I have sketched, the objection has been made, that it detaches the treatise from the whole framework of Greek thought. To this the reply has been given that it is true, but that the recognition of the independence of aesthetics was a step forward in the progress of thought, and that it is our duty to place this step to the credit of Aristotle. To me it seems necessary to modify these views, and I should say that the theory of pleasure as the end of poetry is not merely Aristotelian, but Greek and older than Aristotle.

If this is true, we should naturally expect to find this theory forming part of the hedonistic philosophy against which Plato waged a ceaseless warfare. Now on turning to Plato's discussion of poetry we actually find him fighting steadily against such a theory which he designates as the theory of the many; the engagement, to be sure, does not become a pitched battle, but the firing along the picket line breaks out repeatedly. Thus in the *Laws* (ii. 655c) Plato says: "And yet most people tell us that the ability to provide pleasure is the standard of correctness for the choral art" and pronounces this view unbearable and unholy. A little later Plato restates this theory of the many in the words: "he who brings it to pass that we are cheered and delighted the most, must be deemed the most competent, and be adjudged the victor," and suggests that there is herein an element of truth which he formulates as follows: "This much I too concede to the many, the choral art must be judged by pleasure, not however by the pleasure of any and everybody; but, roughly speaking, she is the fairest Muse who delights the best and the educated; or, to be precise, she who delights the one man pre-eminent in virtue and education." A sharp skirmish begins in 667b but there is no occasion to follow it, as we are concerned merely with the existence of the theory, and not with Plato's reasons for rejecting it.

If such passages were confined to the *Laws*, it would be possible to maintain that the theory of an aesthetic standard

for poetry developed only towards the close of Plato's life. In reality, however, we find this same theory present in the *Republic,* although it is there brushed aside more lightly. An instance is the passage (iii, 387b) where Plato begs forgiveness of Homer and the other poets for cancelling some verses descriptive of the terrors of Hades, "not because they are not poetic, and in the opinion of the many pleasant to hear; but, the more poetic they are, the less are they fit for the ears of boys and men, who are to be freemen, afraid of slavery more than of death." The poetic vocabulary of this sphere of thought—so Plato continues—is filled with words which make us shudder. For fear that these may cause the courage of his warders to lose its temper, he demands that such words be avoided "though perhaps they do serve some other end." The end which he thus disdains to discuss can hardly be anything but pleasure; others may reckon with such an end, Plato will have none of it. The same attitude is taken in 390a, where certain outbursts of temper towards a superior are condemned, "because, I suppose, it is not conducive to self-control for young men to hear them; we need not be surprised, if they produce in their hearers something else, namely pleasure." Again the implication is that such a theory is beneath discussion. The contrast between this theory and Plato's own views crops out in 397d; Socrates has distinguished three types of style, the simple which scorns all unworthy imitation, a style which imitates anything and everything, and one blended of these two; he asks Adeimantos which of these styles they shall admit into the new state, and on being told the simple style, proceeds as follows:

"And yet, Adeimantos, the blended style also is at all events sweet; while the style opposed to your choice is by far the sweetest in the opinion of children, pedagogues and most of the vulgar herd."

"Yes, it is the sweetest."

"But, perhaps, you mean that it would not fit our Republic." A little later (398a) comes a famous passage in which we can again catch the undertone of the opposing theory: "And so it

seems that if a man, able in virtue of his art to become every sort of creature and to imitate everything, should come to our city in person and wishing to exhibit his productions, we would prostrate ourselves before him in the belief that he was sacred, marvellous and pleasing; but we would tell him that there is not a man of his sort in our city, nor is it lawful for there to be one; and we would send him away to some other city after pouring myrrh upon his head and crowning him with a woolen fillet; while we ourselves would employ a more austere and less pleasing poet for the sake of the public good." This note is still clearer in a passage from the tenth book (607cd): "Nevertheless let it be said that if the poetry and imitation which aims at pleasure can give any proof that it ought to exist in a well-governed city, we will be delighted to receive it; for we are well aware that we are enchanted by it: . . . And we will grant to its representatives, to such as are themselves not poets but only lovers of poetry, an opportunity to speak in its behalf (provided they forego the aid of meter), for the purpose of showing that it is not only pleasing, but also of service to governments and humanity. For undoubtedly we will gain if it appear not merely pleasing but also beneficial."

In the *Gorgias* Socrates declares that poetry as practised at Athens aims solely at the delectation of its audiences; and Callicles either accepts this proposition outright, or is content to hint at the possibility of making some limitation. Here we are not told explicitly that the many believe this is what poetry ought to do, but such an understanding is suggested by the passages just cited from the *Laws* and the *Republic*. This interpretation serves also to explain why Socrates' assertion passes unchallenged, and at the same time makes the course of the dialogue more dramatic. The previous argument has shown that an art which seeks merely pleasure is, in reality, not liberal but servile; the reader now sees suddenly, as if revealed by a lightning flash, that poetry as he knows it, is in Plato's eyes merely a species of flattery, the true analogy for the poet being not the physician but the pastry cook.

The basic idea of the *Poetics*, that the purpose of poetry is

to please, can thus be traced back on the evidence of Plato to the beginning of the fourth century. Of the genesis of this idea Plato has unfortunately chosen to tell us nothing. Whether it was actually as wide-spread and as crudely hedonistic, as Plato represents it to be, may be doubted; but for the central fact—that such ideas were held by Greeks of his time—we have Plato's testimony, and there is no reason for impugning it. On the contrary I think it reasonable to believe that the idea is older than the point to which we can trace it, although I know that to say this is to run counter to one of the commonplaces of the history of Greek literature.

For Plato's theory the fundament is the concept of the poet as the people's teacher, and this we are told is the way in which the Greek people themselves were accustomed to view their relation to their poets. The assertion is so familiar that there is little effort to substantiate it. Sometimes, to be sure, it is asserted that folk poetics are always ethical, a conclusion reached by observing the force with which moral sentiments appeal to the galleries of all modern theaters. This argument however confuses two things, delight in moral sentiments with the belief that the duty of the poet is to instruct and improve. The former seems a universal trait of popular thought, and for Athens could be proved directly by pointing to the number of *gnomai* or moral maxims which the tragedies contain. The second point is not established as universal by any induction from modern theatrical life, and we are warranted in demanding definite proof before conceding that such was the popular belief of Athens in the fifth century.

As such evidence is regularly cited a passage in the *Frogs* of Aristophanes. In the Old Comedy there occurs normally in each play a scene of stereotyped form, known technically as the *contest* or *agon*, during which the action of the play is suspended, while some fundamental question is being thrashed out in debate. The *agon* of the *Frogs* takes place in Hades, the contestants are Aeschylus and Euripides, the question at issue is the right to occupy the seat of the master tragedian, the god of the theater Dionysus himself is present, nominally

as umpire, in reality to play the buffoon and see that the scene remain comic. Comedy could devise no situation better adapted for enlightening us about the end of Tragedy. I will quote in Rogers' admirable translation the verses (1008 ff.) which bear most directly upon our question:

Aesch. Come tell me what are the points for which a noble poet our praise obtains.
Eur. For his ready wit and his councils sage, and because the citizen folk he trains
To be better townsmen and worthier men. *Aesch.* If then you have done the very reverse
Found noble-hearted and virtuous men, and altered them each and all, for the worse
Pray what is the meed you deserve to get? *Dio.* Nay, ask not him. He deserves to die. . . .
Aesch. But Phaedras and Stheneboeas? No! no harlotry business deformed my plays,
And none can say that ever I drew a love-sick woman in all my days. . . .
Eur. Was then, I wonder, the tale I told of Phaedra's passionate love untrue?
Aesch. Not so, but tales of incestuous vice the sacred poet should hide from view.
Nor ever exhibit and blazon forth on the public stage to to the public ken.
For boys a teacher at school is found, but we, the poets, are teachers of men.
We are BOUND things honest and pure to speak.

This passage is universally taken at its face value; the views expressed are believed to be those of Aristophanes himself, and it is thought that in them he is merely voicing the convictions of the people. For the older school of Aristophanic interpretation no other understanding was possible; for, according to it, Aristophanes was a patriotic, wise and brave statesman, whose primary intention in producing a comedy was to teach Athens the lesson of the greatest value at the time. To set forth even in outline my reasons for dissenting from such views would require more space than this article permits. I must, therefore, be content to write for those who are willing to assume that the true view of Aristophanes' work is summed up in the saying of Wilamowitz, the comedies are meant to

be farces, and must be understood as farces. For the earlier school Aristophanes' seriousness was always earnest, for us it may be only mock seriousness, which is a very effective method of provoking laughter; and we realize accordingly, that whenever Aristophanes seems most in earnest, we must be most on our guard against the danger of misunderstanding him. It will be well therefore to see whether he is not in this passage from the *Frogs* sneering covertly at the theory which he is so ardently preaching.

There are several reasons for disbelieving that the theory of the poet as 'teacher of men' is either a popular belief or representative of Aristophanes' own ideas. In the first place there is the isolation of the passage. To be sure passages from other comedies have been cited to show that Aristophanes so regarded himself, but on examination they serve only to strengthen our suspicions. In the *Acharnians,* for instance, we are told that the King of Persia predicted success in the war for whichever party had the benefit of Aristophanes' abuse; and in the *Wasps* Aristophanes, on the ground of his fight against Cleon, claims to be a second Heracles, one who has cleansed the land of its monsters. In reality, the King of Persia never heard of Aristophanes; while Cleon lived and died at the head of the Athenian state, and if we knew the details of the fight, there is good chance that we should find Aristophanes a second Dionysus masquerading with club and lion skin. The grotesque exaggeration and distortion of the facts is evident, and points to the conclusion that, when Aristophanes presents himself as a serious adviser, the pose is meant to be ludicrous. The best modern commentary is the picture of *Judge* pointing to the full dinner pail. The theory of poetry presented in the *Frogs* may be illustrated from Plato, from Isocrates and from other writers under the influence of Plato, but no editor has adduced a single parallel from tragedy. This indicates that the concept is philosophic rather than popular. For, if such a view had existed among the Athenians, it must have reacted upon their poets, and we should then expect to find somewhere in Tragedy a passage showing that the poet was

conscious of his high calling and of his responsibilities. It is true that the opportunity would have been restricted by the objectivity of tragedy, still Euripides does manage to find means of expressing his own ideas and feelings. It is true also that the bulk of Tragedy has been lost, still such a passage, had it existed, could hardly have escaped quotation by some later moralist. Allowances may be made on both these grounds and still the silence of Tragedy will remain significant.

To argue from a man's actions to his theories, to infer his preaching from his practise is always perilous. Particularly is this so, when, as with the writers of Old Comedy, the man's standards of morality are so far removed from modern ideas of decency and refinement, that it is difficult to put oneself in his place. Still, the composition of a play such as the *Thesmophoriazousai* runs so directly counter to the concept of the poet's calling preached in the *Frogs;* there is in it such a 'blazoning forth on the public stage to the public ken' of things which the 'sacred poet should hide from view'; that the sincerity of the preaching in the *Frogs* is inevitably brought into question. If the contradiction concerned merely some detail, we might be content with noting that Aristophanes did not always practise what he preached; but a contradiction, which affects the very foundation of the poet's art, must be regarded more seriously. To strengthen our suspicions:— the corollary to the proposition that the poet is 'the teacher of men,' is that the state must supervise the production of poetry. Plato plans expressly for state censorship, and it is inconceivable that Aristophanes should have missed the necessary connection between the two ideas. Now for Old Comedy state censorship was a danger ever present, and threatening to its very existence. Freedom of speech, *parrhesia,* was the life blood of Aristophanes' art, and he was no true friend to any theory which threatened to check its flow.

If these considerations incline us to question the seriousness of Aristophanes, and to doubt the popular origin of this ethical concept of the poet's calling, let us see whether it is not possible to frame a better hypothesis. An essential charac-

teristic of Greek poetry is its union with religion—Gilbert Murray has recently (*Atlantic Monthly,* Nov. 1912) given beautiful expression to this idea—resting on the fact that the thoughts and interests of men were then much less differentiated than is the case nowadays. The union was so intimate that there could be no question at that time of the relationship between art and religion, because the two were perfectly at one. The beautiful and the good were viewed as identical, and the whole man responded to the work of the poet, without distinguishing his pleasure, his instruction and his moral betterment. This was the true folk attitude of the Greeks, and the dissolution of the harmony came not from popular reflections about the end of poetry, but from philosophical speculations. The leaders in the new movement were the sophists, and how the change was brought about, can be seen from the *Protagoras* of Plato. The program of these wandering lecturers offered a practical training for the purpose of making, as Protagoras himself expresses it, 'worthier men' and 'good citizens.' This training was in reality something new in the intellectual life of Greece; but the sophists, in their effort to dispel popular prejudice, endeavored to show that such had been the secret intention of the great poets; that the latter, though striving to conceal the fact, had actually labored to instruct and improve the people.

Such ideas were the germs from which the theory presented in the *Frogs* springs, and perhaps we may even go a step further and indicate as Aristophanes' immediate source a work of Protagoras. In the *Ecclesiazousai* Aristophanes makes merry over the form of family life which Plato advocates in the *Republic.* This comedy was produced in 389 B. C., and consequently some scholars have been led to argue for a publication of part of the *Republic* before that date, while others have sought to compromise on the assumption that Plato's ideas had been circulated orally in advance of their publication. The connection between the *Frogs* and the *Republic* is also obvious, though hitherto it has seemed without significance, because of the belief that both Plato and Aristophanes had

started from a folk idea. If that belief is abandoned it becomes necessary to find some explanation for this double bond of connection between the comedies of Aristophanes and the *Republic* of Plato. Now malicious gossip reaching us through Diogenes Laertes (3. 37) had it that the *Republic* of Plato was a plagiarism from Protagoras. The charge need not be believed; but it could never have been brought, unless there had been a work by Protagoras bearing to the *Republic* a resemblance sufficient to lend some color to the accusation. This work is the common source which both the comedian and the philosopher have used, each in his own fashion. In it Protogoras must have handled the relation of poetry to the state, and the dialogue of Plato which bears his name suffices to show that the sophist must have depicted the poet as a forerunner of his own art, as a 'teacher of men.'

The formulation of this doctrine by Protagoras must have evoked promptly its antithesis, the theory that the end of poetry is to please; and there must have been also various attempts to reconcile these antitheses, to find some *via media* between the two extremes. For the existence of the theory of pleasure we have the evidence of Plato at a time but little later, and one is inclined to connect this theory with the name of Gorgias. For the compromises direct evidence is lacking, unless it be afforded by the attitude of Callicles in the *Gorgias;* they may, however, be assumed as intrinsically very probable. At all events we may be certain that the question was discussed vigorously in the literary circles of Athens towards the close of the fifth century. This debate gives the background for the true understanding of the passage in the *Frogs.*

An important element in the success of Aristophanes was his ability to amuse at the same time the most diverse elements in his audience. For religion the matter has been treated excellently by Couat, and there is no occasion to rehearse here the details; it being sufficient to recall the general fact that Aristophanes helps consciously the sophistic attack on religion at the very moment when he seems most ardent in its condemnation. Similarly the *agon* of the *Frogs* has a different mean-

ing for different classes of spectators. For the unsophisticated there is the simple surface meaning; they may thrill with delight at the high morality and noble sentiments of this picture of the poet's calling. Meanwhile the enlightened litterateur will catch at the outset the allusion to the theory of Protagoras, and doubtless was to find as the scene progressed, many clever side hits which either escape us entirely, or are beyond the possibility of proof, because the original of the parody is lost. One such must have been the encomium on the *Seven against Thebes* as 'with the war-god filled' which is a quotation from Gorgias; we may also note that both Aeschylus here and Protagoras in Plato appeal to Orpheus, Musaios and Hesiod, but any attempt to follow the matter in detail must prove fruitless.

Aristophanes' precise position in the debate remains indeterminable, because he has no real wish to convince, but is merely seeking to amuse. That he cannot be, as would appear on the surface, simply in agreement with Protagoras, is clear from what has already been said, and is besides indicated by two points in his handling of the theme. If the conflict between Aeschylus and Euripides were really in Aristophanes' eyes a conflict betwen the good and the evil of an art devoted entirely to the moral betterment of men, he could never permit himself on account of minor defects to rake Aeschylus as severely as he does. Aeschylus emerges from the fight as victor, but he has been as badly marked as Euripides. Virtue triumphant, but with a countenance so disfigured, is no edifying spectacle.

Besides this there is the puzzling end of the contest. I do not refer to the sudden shifting of the prize, in consequence of which the victor is to return to earth with Dionysus, and still retain his right to the chair of Tragedy in Hades. That shows perhaps that the play was worked at from different points of view, which the poet did not finally succeed in combining with perfect smoothness. That is another question which at present need not concern us. Even apart from it the method of finally determining the victor is surprising. The competition passes

from the fundamental principles of Tragedy to various phases of the art; the prologues and odes of the contestants are searched for merits and demerits; their verses are put on the scales; and then suddenly everything is made to hinge on a political catechism. Whichever can give the best advice about dealing with Alcibiades shall be the victor. How puzzling this is, can best be shown by a quotation from Rogers: Dionysus declares "that he will choose, not necessarily the better tragedian (which was the sole object of the poetical competition) but the man who can give the state the wiser political counsel . . . . Yet the decision though made without the slightest reference to the dramatic merits of the two contending tragedians carries with it strangely enough the right to occupy the Tragic Chair." An admirable remark from the standpoint of modern criticism, but on Protagoras' theory the man who can give the state the wiser counsel is *ipso facto* the better tragedian. There is then no better way of finding the best dramatist than by asking him whether he is for or against Alcibiades, that being the paramount issue of the day. In comparison with his answer to this question, his prologues, his odes, his verses count for nothing; the only real test of his value is whether he is fitted to be a 'teacher of men.' This amounts to a *reductio ad absurdum* of the theory, and it must have been so intended by Aristophanes.

To conclude with a summary of my view:—the question of an aesthetic or ethical standard for poetry rests on a differentiation of ideas too subtle for the popular thought of the time when Greek poetry was at its zenith. The discussion was opened when the sophists claimed that the poets had been secretly, what they themselves were professedly 'teachers of men.' The development of this idea, most notably by Protagoras, started the opposite theory of an aesthetic standard, more or less modified by ethical considerations. Aristophanes parodied the debate for the amusement of the litterateurs present, at the same time counting on its high moral sound to please the simpler people. Plato adopted Protagoras' theory of the function of the poet in preference to the aesthetic concept

of poetry which he regarded as crudely hedonistic. His originality lay in his minor premise, that poetry as the world knew it, did not and could not comply with the requirements of the major. Aristotle on the contrary upheld the aesthetic standard, striving at the same time to give proper emphasis to the ethical values it necessarily implies. In later times Eratosthenes followed Aristotle, but the main current of Greek thought continued to flow in the channel opened by Protagoras.

George Melville Bolling.

SOME MINOR IRISH POETS (1800–1850).

For the first fifty years of the nineteenth century Ireland presents, on the whole, a woeful picture.

In 1800 the Legislative Union between Great Britain and Ireland was effected. The Act of Union was a solemn treaty made between two sovereign states; but, with the disappearance of her parliament, there disappeared from Ireland the last vestige of her independence. Previously a separate kingdom, she lost that character with the loss of her separate constitutional existence. The kingdom of Ireland was merged in the United Kingdom, and the British monarch was thenceforward no longer king of Great Britain *and* king of Ireland; he was now king of Great Britain and Ireland.

The splendid promises and the brilliant prophecies, which had been used as arguments to bring about the Union, were not destined to be fulfilled. Instead of peace and quietness, there were turmoil and agitation and bad feeling, which at different times went perilously close to war, and on two occasions, in 1803 and in 1848, did actually eventuate in open insurrection; instead of religious freedom and the wholesome spirit it engenders, there were fierce sectarian animosity and all the bitternesses and all the meannesses which those words seem necessarily to imply; instead of national progress, the growth of national wealth, and social happiness, there were grinding poverty and fearful discontent, which led to the formation of one secret society after another and, through them, to daylight and midnight murder and other forms of the wild justice of revenge.

There are certain features of the history of that period which, in connection with the topic now under discussion, are specially noteworthy. The first of these was the agitation for Catholic Emancipation, which was continuous from 1800 to 1829, and reached its height from 1823 onward to its close. In 1829, mainly through the instrumentality of Daniel O'Con-

nell and the priests and stout-hearted electors of the County Clare, the Catholic Relief Act was passed. Although grudgingly given, surrounded by offensive limitations, and accompanied by the disfranchisement throughout the country of that very class of forty-shilling freeholders whose votes in Clare had made its enactment imperative, this measure of emancipation was a great boon to the 6,500,000 Catholics of Ireland, as well as to their co-religionists in Great Britain.

The Tithe Reform agitation followed, and it led to great misery and persecution and lamentable loss of life. The people naturally objected to contribute to the support of a church to which they did not belong, and resented and, to the utmost of their power, resisted payment of the hateful tax. The Tithe War, as it was not inappropriately called, was long drawn out. Its acute phase, marked by harrowing scenes of violence and bloodshed, was between 1831 and 1838. The struggle was brought to an end, not in a very satisfactory manner indeed, by the Tithe Commutation Act, passed in 1838.

The strongest and fiercest agitation of all, though not disfigured by criminal violence, was that for Repeal of the Union. It began as early as 1810 and was carried on intermittently until 1840; it then grew in intensity and volume until 1843; reached its climax in 1843 and 1844; and flickered out in slow collapse between 1846 and 1849.

The Repeal agitation died amidst a dying Ireland. There had been famines, some local but all serious, in 1821, 1822, 1831, 1835, 1836, 1837, and 1842. But the famine of 1846-1847—or, to say rightly, 1846-1850—eclipsed them all. It was caused by the failure of at least half the potato crop in the autumn of 1845, and by its total failure in the autumn of 1846. The loss in money in 1845 was estimated at not less than £9,000,000; in 1846 it was calculated to be at the lowest £20,000,000, but £40,000,000 would probably be nearer the mark. But worse than the money loss was the toll of human lives. In 1846, acording to Mitchel's calculations, 300,000 persons perished either of sheer hunger or of fever caused by hunger; in 1847, 500,000 died of famine and disease. Death stalked triumphantly through the land. Even a dispassionate

description of the scenes enacted in Ireland in those dark and evil days causes more genuine horror than do the most fearsome passages in Dante's *Inferno*.

Nor did the devastation cease with those two fateful years. In 1848 there was a partial failure of the harvest, and the dearth thus occasioned, with fever and dysentery thrown in, sent many to their graves. Cholera added its terrors in 1849, and was directly responsible for the carrying off of 36,000 souls. The total number of deaths from famine and disease in this year was 240,000.

Owing to the iniquities of bad land laws and a rapidly increasing population, emigration to foreign countries had been going on in a continuous stream from 1831 to 1841, the average being 43,000 a year. This number was increased in the next five years. In 1846, 106,000 persons left Ireland for places abroad, in addition to 278,000 who fled in search of work to England. In 1847, 215,000 emigrated; nearly as many in 1849; in 1851, when the famine was at an end, 257,000 took their departure. The population, which had been 8,175,124 in 1846, should normally have risen to 9,018,799 by 1851: instead, it had fallen to 6,552,385. The ratio of decrease was so great and so continuous that five years later the London *Times* exultantly boasted that ere long a Celt would be as rare in Ireland as a Red Indian on the shores of Manhattan, as obsolete as the Phœnicians in Cornwall, and that the Catholic religion would be as forgotten as the worship of Astarte.

The evictions, the great clearances, began on the grand scale in 1849, and within twelve months 500,000 persons were dispossessed of land and home. The failure of the Repeal agitation and the miseries of the people led to the ill-starred and abortive insurrection of 1848, and, when that was promptly quashed, Ireland settled down into an apathy and a gloom from which she did not entirely emerge for more than a generation.

From a country so disturbed and so afflicted it is natural to ask if much poetry could be expected. At first blush it might be said that the answer must be, No. But we cannot dogmatise in that hasty fashion. In the first place, it must be

remembered that not every one in Ireland was starving, even in "black '47." There were more than six millions whom the famine did not reach.

In the next place, we must not think that every one was caught up in the whirlwind of the various agitations. Sitting remote amid the rush and bustle of great cities, many a solitary writer turned out his copy of ode or ballad or sonnet, unperturbed. In quiet country homes or within the walls of rectory or manse, of college or convent, many a gentle soul assiduously wooed the Muse.

It must not be forgotten, too, that others than gentle-folk were now beginning to be able to write in English. If we look back to the great names of the Irish writers of English of the eighteenth century, we find that, in addition to belonging to the educated classes and to being as a rule English by descent, they were in every case non-Catholics in religion. No Catholic appears in the list made up of Swift and Steele, Goldsmith and Sterne, Berkeley, Brooke, and Burke. Nor is the reason far to seek. By the shameful provisions of the penal code, Catholics were prevented during nearly all the eighteenth century from giving or receiving an education at home or abroad. A violation of this cruel enactment led to the infliction of dire pains and penalties. Of course the law was evaded in a great many cases; but the general result was that the most quick-witted and intelligent peasantry in Europe were, with rare exceptions, unable to read or write. But after the Emancipation Act of 1829, and particularly after the establishment of the system of National Education in 1831, all that was speedily changed. The schoolmaster was abroad in Ireland then with a vengeance, and schoolhouses filled the land. The generation that received the first benefits of the National Education system was precisely the one that spoke out loud and bold during the great days of the *Nation* newspaper from 1842 to 1848. Among the most valued contributors to that organ of public opinion were artisans and mechanics and sons and daughters of the soil.

Mention of the *Nation* newspaper brings me to the last point that I now wish to make. War and agitation, and even misery,

are not without their spokesmen in verse and prose. Thus it was the ferment in Germany in 1813 and the war for German liberation that gave to the world the *Leyer und Schwert,* the wild war-songs of Karl Theodor Körner; it was the French Revolution that produced the *Marseillaise.* In the Bible we have the picture of the chosen people sitting sorrowful and weeping by the waters of Babylon, as well as Miriam's song of triumph; we have the *Miserere,* as well as the *Magnificat;* we have Job, as well as Judas Macchabæus. So in Ireland the war spirit and the spirit of unrest and of misery itself were vocal in verse and prose; they all found expression through various channels, and especially in the columns of the *Nation,* which was called into existence by the exigencies of the Repeal movement, "to create and foster public opinion in Ireland and make it racy of the soil."

By the limitations of my subject I am debarred from considering any but minor Irish poets. Accordingly, I at once eliminate Thomas Moore; James Clarence Mangan; Sir Samuel Ferguson; William Allingham; Denis Florence McCarthy; Aubrey de Vere; and his father, Sir Aubrey: these I rank unquestionably among major Irish singers. I also eliminate Thomas Davis, because, whatever opinion I may entertain of his poetry as poetry, I recognise that he was a great Irishman, and that by his poetry, as well as by his prose, he accomplished great things for Ireland. In Ireland, at least, he would be a bold man who should associate anything minor with the revered name of Thomas Osborne Davis.

There is still left a large residue of poets: over a hundred by actual count. Now, if I should attempt to deal with all these, it would be like the reciting of the Litany of Irish Poets. There would be a string of names as long as the Litany of the Saints—and that is a rather exacting penance, as some of us may have ere now learned. Such a penance I do not intend to impose. What I propose to do is to notice a few of the less known and a few of the better known of the minor Irish poets of the period. I deal only with those Irish poets who wrote in English.

In the eighties of last century, when a few of us were trying, not entirely without success, to galvanise life into a paper known as the *Irish Fireside,* there used to come occasionally into the office in Abbey Street, Dublin, two elderly men, whose ostensible motive was to offer kindly advice and valuable suggestions, but who really wanted to talk of the brave days of old. They always found willing listeners, for each of them was a man of note, and each formed a link with what then seemed to us a remote past. These two venerable personages were no other than Charles Patrick Meehan and John Kells Ingram.

Father Meehan had been born as far back as 1812, and loomed large in our eyes as the great historian of *The Fate and Fortunes of Tyrone and Tyrconnell* and *The Geraldines,* but still more as the friend and companion of Davis and Duffy and Mangan. He was a young man when the *Nation* was founded in 1842, and he was a contributor to it almost from the beginning. His pieces were signed either with his own name or with the pen-name of "Clericus." He lived on until 1890, and during my student days and afterwards as a young professor in University College, I saw much of this kindly Irish gentleman, and from him I always derived encouragement and inspiration. If for nothing else than the following piece, which appeared in the *Nation* on November 5, 1842, he deserves a place among Irish poets. It is entitled:

Boyhood's Years.

Ah! why should I recall them—the gay, the joyous years,
Ere hope was cross'd or pleasure dimm'd by sorrow and by tears?
Or why should mem'ry love to trace youth's glad and sunlit way,
When those who made its charms so sweet are gather'd to decay?
The summer's sun shall come again to brighten hill and bower—
The teeming earth its fragrance bring beneath the balmy shower;
But all in vain will mem'ry strive, in vain we shed our tears—
They're gone away and can't return—the friends of boyhood's years!

Ah! why then wake my sorrow, and bid me now count o'er
The vanished friends so dearly prized—the days to come no more—
The happy days of infancy, when no guile our bosoms knew,

Nor reck'd we of the pleasures that with each moment flew?
'Tis all in vain to weep for them—the past a dream appears;
And where are they—the lov'd, the young, the friends of boyhood's
years?

Go seek them in the cold churchyard—they long have stol'n to rest;
But do not weep, for their young cheeks by woe were ne'er oppress'd;
Life's sun for them in splendour set—no cloud came o'er the ray
That lit them from this gloomy world upon their joyous way.
No tears about their graves be shed—but sweetest flowers be flung,
The fittest off'ring thou canst make to hearts that perish young—
To hearts this world has never torn with racking hopes and fears;
For bless'd are they who pass away in boyhood's happy years!

John Kells Ingram was born in the County Donegal in 1823. He was a many-sided man. He held in succession in Trinity College, Dublin, the Professorship of Greek, the Professorship of English Literature, the Senior Lecturership, the Librarianship, and the Vice-Provostship. He was also President of the Royal Irish Academy and a Commissioner for the publication of the Ancient Laws and Institutions of Ireland. Further, he was something of an economist and sociologist. Indeed his reputation in these respects was so great that it was he who was selected to write the articles on "Political Economy" and "Slavery" for the ninth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. In addition to his other accomplishments he was a poet. In 1900, when he was in his seventy-eighth year, he published a volume of poems which gained great favour among the cognoscenti. While he was yet a student he sent to the *Nation* the celebrated lyric, *The Memory of the Dead,* and it appeared there without signature. It used to be said that in later years he was rather ashamed to have been so violently national and was inclined to disown the poem, and Carlyle said of him in his Irish tour of 1849 that his opinions had already changed. I believe that then or later they did change; but so far was he from repudiating *The Memory of the Dead* that he formally acknowledged it to be his by including it in the volume of his poems to which I have already referred. Ingram wrote beautiful sonnets and other pieces; but I think I am safe in saying

that to nine-tenths of the Irishmen who know of him at all he is known solely by his youthful lyric. If we imagine that at a banquet or some such function somebody had spoken disparagingly of the men who rose in rebellion in Ireland in 1798, and that the poet, with fire in his eye, gets up to rebuke the slanderer by proposing the toast of the memory of the dead patriots, we shall have the *mise en scène* and will thereby perhaps better understand the spirit of the poem. It is entitled:

THE MEMORY OF THE DEAD.

Who fears to speak of Ninety-Eight?
  Who blushes at the name?
When cowards mock the patriot's fate,
  Who hangs his head for shame?
He's all a knave or half a slave
  Who slights his country thus:
But a true man, like you, man,
  Will fill your glass with us.

We drink the memory of the brave,
  The faithful and the few—
Some lie far off beyond the wave,
  Some sleep in Ireland, too;
All, all are gone—but still lives on
  The fame of those who died;
And true men, like you, men,
  Remember them with pride.

Some on the shores of distant lands
  Their weary hearts have laid,
And by the stranger's heedless hands
  Their lonely graves were made;
But though their clay be far away
  Beyond the Atlantic foam,
In true men, like you, men,
  Their spirit's still at home.

The dust of some is Irish earth;
  Among their own they rest;

And the same land that gave them birth
  Has caught them to her breast;
And we will pray that from their clay
  Full many a race may start
Of true men, like you, men,
  To act as brave a part.

They rose in dark and evil days
  To right their native land;
They kindled here a living blaze
  That nothing shall withstand.
Alas! that Might can vanquish Right—
  They fell, and passed away;
But true men, like you, men,
  Are plenty here to-day.

Then here's their memory—may it be
  For us a guiding light,
To cheer our strife for liberty,
  And teach us to unite!
Through good and ill, be Ireland's still,
  Though sad as theirs, your fate;
And true men, be you, men,
  Like those of Ninety-Eight.

A third of the poets of the *Nation* with whom I was brought a good deal in contact towards the close of his long and honourable career was Denny Lane. He was born in Cork in 1818 and died there in 1896. He is known as a poet principally by two pieces which appeared in the *Nation* in 1844 and 1845, entitled, respectively, *Kate of Arraglen* and *The Lament of the Irish Maiden*. He retired from verse-making to the pursuit of commerce, and was a successful and prosperous manufacturer and merchant in Cork. He took a great interest in the Irish industrial revival; nor did he forget his old love, for he was active in the literary movement in Cork. *The Lament of the Irish Maiden* is often called simply "Carrigdhoun." It has been set to music and has secured a great vogue as a popular song on concert platforms. Many a one who is captivated by

the music does not know who wrote the words. Its metrical structure is closely allied to the Gaelic. Here it is—without the music:

THE LAMENT OF THE IRISH MAIDEN.

On Carrigdhoun the heath is brown,
The clouds are dark o'er Ardnalee,
And many a stream comes rushing down
To swell the angry Ownabwee.
The moaning blast is sweeping past
Through many a leafless tree,
And I'm alone—for he is gone—
My hawk is flown—*Ochone machree!*

The heath was brown on Carrigdhoun,
Bright shone the sun on Ardnalee,
The dark green trees bent, trembling, down
To kiss the slumbering Ownabwee,
That happy day, 'twas but last May—
'Tis like a dream to me—
When Donnell swore—aye, o'er and o'er—
We'd part no more—*astore machree!*

Soft April showers and bright May flowers
Will bring the summer back again,
But will they bring me back the hours
I spent with my brave Donnell then?
'Tis but a chance, for he's gone to France,
To wear the *fleur-de-lis;*
But I'll follow you my Donnell Dhu,
For still I'm true to you, *machree!*

Another of the poets of the *Nation,* about whom I learned a good deal through College tradition and also from friends who had known him well, but whom I never met for the good reason that he died before I was born, was Richard Dalton Williams. He was born in Dublin of Tipperary parents in 1822, and was a student at Tullabeg, at Carlow College, and afterwards at Dublin and Edinburgh. Just before the rising of 1848, when

Mitchel had been convicted and his paper, *The United Irishman,* suppressed, Williams and Kevin Izod O'Doherty established *The Irish Tribune,* in which they at once started to preach plain sedition. For this offence O'Doherty was put on trial and convicted; but Williams, tried on the same charge of treason felony, was acquitted. He subsequently took a medical degree, and after practising in Dublin for about two years, he came to this country, and was professor of Belles Lettres in the Jesuit College at Spring Hill, Mobile, Alabama. He married Miss Connolly of New Orleans in 1856, and in that city resumed his practice of the medical profession, and carried it on with considerable success. His health, however, was breaking, and he sought change at Baton Rouge and at Thibodeaux in Louisiana. Here he wrote his last poem, the *Song of the Irish-American Regiments,* and here he fell a victim to that disease whose ravages he had so pathetically described in *The Dying Girl.* He died of consumption on July 5, 1862, in his fortieth year. A monument of Carrara marble, erected by his countrymen serving in two companies of the 8th Regiment, N. H. Volunteers, marks his last resting-place. He had grown weary of the struggle with the world, as is shown by the following lines which he wrote on the death of one of his children:—

ON THE DEATH OF HIS INFANT DAUGHTER, KATIE.

Dear baby-daughter! in the light divine
No angel waves a purer wing than thine.
Soon may my sorrows, like thy days, be o'er—
Soon may I see, love, wonder and adore,
Gazing on God with thee for evermore!

When I was a student in Carlow College, I occupied the room which Williams had occupied in his day, and on one of the panes of glass in the window he had scratched his name with a diamond. One is inclined to ask with Thackeray regarding Goldsmith's still more famous signature in Trinity College, Dublin: Whose diamond? In the Book of Honour in Carlow College are preserved ten of Williams's juvenile

pieces which have never been published. From Carlow as a student he sent up to the *Nation* his celebrated lyric, *The Munster War-Song,* which appeared in the issue of that paper of January 7, 1843, over his pen-name of "Shamrock." It attracted wide attention. In the issue of January 21, 1843, the editor asserted that "'Shamrock' is a jewel. He cannot write too often. His verses are full of vigour, and as natural as the harp of Tara." The result was that when Williams went up to Dublin to pursue his medical studies, he was appointed to a position on the staff of the *Nation.*

William's poems may be divided into four classes: national, devotional, humorous, and pathetic. In his martial odes there is the very crash of battle. His religious poems are not nearly so well known as they deserve. His outbursts of religious piety in *Before the Blessed Sacrament* and *Contrition—Adoration* are really remarkable. His paraphrases of the *Dies Irae,* the *Adoro Te Devote,* and the *Stabat Mater* were given a wide circulation by their inclusion in a *Manual of Devotions* compiled by the nuns of St. Vincent's Hospital, Dublin, to which Williams was at one time attached. Many persons still read them without knowing who was the author. Williams had a fine vein of humour, but it ran rather to the technical order. He was a successful parodist. He parodied Davis's *Oh! for a Steed!* in *Oh! for a Feed!,* O'Hagan's *Dear Land* in *Dear Law,* Mangan's *Time of the Barmecides* in *The Barmaid's Eyes,* and Drayton's *Battle of Agincourt* in *Romance in Real Life.* His two best known pieces are perhaps *The Sister of Charity* and *The Dying Girl.* This is

THE DYING GIRL.

From a Munster vale they brought her,
  From the pure and balmy air,
An Ormond peasant's daughter,
  With blue eyes and golden hair—
They brought her to the city,
  And she faded slowly there:
Consumption has no pity
  For blue eyes and golden hair.

When I saw her first reclining,
Her lips were moved in pray'r,
And the setting sun was shining
On her loosened golden hair.
When our kindly glances met her
Deadly brilliant was her eye,
And she said that she was better,
While we knew that she must die.

She speaks of Munster valleys,
The pattern, dance, and fair,
And her thin hand feebly dallies
With her scattered golden hair.
When silently we listened
To her breath with quiet care,
Her eyes with wonder glistened,
And she asked us what was there.

The poor thing smiled to ask it,
And her pretty mouth laid bare,
Like gems within a casket,
A string of pearlets rare.
We said that we were trying,
By the gushing of her blood,
And the time she took in sighing,
To know if she were good.

Well, she smiled and chatted gaily;
Though we saw in mute despair
The hectic brighter daily,
And the death-dew on her hair.
And oft her wasted fingers
Beating time upon the bed,
O'er some old tune she lingers,
And she bows her golden head.

At length the harp is broken,
And the spirit in its strings,
As the last decree is spoken,
To its source exulting springs.

Descending swiftly from the skies,
  Her guardian angel came,
He struck God's lightning from her eyes,
  And bore him back the flame.

Before the sun had risen
  Through the lark-loved morning air,
Her young soul left its prison,
  Undefiled by sin or care.
I stood beside the couch in tears,
  Where pale and calm she slept,
And, though I've gazed on death for years,
  I blush not that I wept.
I checked with effort pity's sighs,
  And left the matron there,
To close the curtains of her eyes,
  And bind her golden hair.

Any account, however slight, of the poets of the *Nation* would be certainly one-sided and lacking in courtesy, unless some mention were made of the three most famous of the women writers who adorned its pages. They are known, respectively, as "Mary," "Eva," and "Speranza." "Mary" was Ellen Mary Patrick Downing, who, born in Cork in 1828, entered a convent in 1849, and died in 1869. Her religious poetry has been collected in two volumes under the titles of *Voices of the Heart,* published in 1868 and again in 1880, and *Poems for Children,* published in 1881. Her national and love poetry remains uncollected. Of the latter category the two best known pieces are *My Owen* and *Talk by the Blackwater.* I select this tender lyric:

My Owen.

Proud of you, fond of you, clinging so near to you,
Light is my heart now I know I am dear to you!
Glad is my voice now, so free it may sing to you
All the wild love that is burning within for you!
Tell me once more, tell it over and over,

The tale of that eve that first saw you my lover.
Now I need never blush
At my heart's hottest gush;
The wife of my Owen her heart may discover.

Proud of you, fond of you, having all right in you!
Quitting all else through my love and delight in you!
Glad is my heart, since 'tis beating so nigh to you!
Light is my step, for it always may fly to you!
Clasped in your arms where no sorrow can reach to me,
Reading your eyes till new love they shall teach to me,
Though wild and weak till now,
By that blessed marriage vow,
More than the wisest know your heart shall preach to me.

"Eva" was Eva Mary Kelly. She was born at Headfort, in the County Galway, about 1825. She was engaged to be married to Kevin Izod O'Doherty when he was brought to trial on the charge of treason felony. The jury twice disagreed, and then he was offered a virtual pardon in the shape of a nominal sentence, if he would plead guilty. He sent for Eva. "What ought I do?", said he. "Do?", said the brave girl, "why be a man, and face the worst. I will wait for you, however long the sentence may be." He was tried again next day, found guilty, and sentenced to ten years' transportation. In course of time he returned, and two days after he arrived in Ireland the faithful couple were made man and wife. They emigrated to Australia and there attained to considerable eminence.

"Speranza" was the pen-name of Jane Francesca Elgee, who subsequently by marriage became Mrs. Wilde and later Lady Wilde. She was a Protestant clergyman's daughter and was born in County Wexford in 1826. In 1844 she began to contribute to the *Nation* in prose and verse. Her contributions came to be eagerly looked for, and they helped materially to increase the circulation of the paper. When Gavan Duffy, as editor of the *Nation*, stood in the dock in 1848 on the charge of high treason, the most telling article read against him was one entitled *Jacta Alea Est* ("The Die is Cast"). It was an

unparalleled revolutionary document, a sort of prose poem, a frantic appeal to arms, and, as sentence after sentence fell on the hushed court, the effect was electric. When the Attorney-General had finished his reading, there was a murmur of long pent-up emotions, and then suddenly from the ladies' gallery came a cry, "I am the culprit, if crime it be." It was Speranza who spoke: *Jacta Alea Est* was her production. Her intervention was not without effect. Three different juries disagreed in Duffy's case, and at length his prosecution was abandoned. Lady Wilde lived until 1896, and was an ardent litterateur almost to the last. Among her many other titles to fame, she was the mother of that unfortunate man of genius, Oscar Wilde, who died in Paris in 1900.

I should give but an imperfect picture of the period under notice, if I made it appear that all the Irish writers belonged to the *Nation* or shared its political views. There were some who were bitterly opposed to its policy; others who apparently were unmoved by the great political struggle. Of the latter type let me present Cecil Frances Alexander. She was the daughter of Major Humphreys, an officer in the Royal Marines, and was born in the County Wicklow in 1818. She was early attracted by the Tractarian or Oxford Movement, which was begun by Keble's Oxford Assize Sermon on National Apostasy in July, 1833. She came under the influence of Dr. Walter Farquhar Hook, Dean of Chichester, who was very friendly to the Tractarians, and subsequently of Keble himself, who edited and wrote a preface for her *Hymns for Little Children.* Like Keble, she did not cross the Rubicon into Catholicism. Instead, she married the Rev. William Alexander, then a Protestant Rector in the north of Ireland, but destined subsequently to be Bishop of Derry (1867), Archbishop of Armagh (1896), and Primate of All Ireland (1897). In 1846 Miss Humphreys, as she then was, published her first book, *Verses for Holy Seasons.* Her *Hymns for Little Children,* with Keble's preface, came out in 1848. Besides these, she published several volumes of poems. Those worthiest of remembrance were edited soon after her death (which took place in 1895) by her

husband, under the title of *Poems of Cecil Frances Alexander.* She is best known as a hymn writer. Her most popular hymns are perhaps *The Roseate Hues of Early Dawn; Jesus calls us o'er the Tumult;* and, especially, *There is a green Hill far away.* Of these latter words Gounod said that they were so harmonious and rhythmic that they seemed to set themselves to music. She could also write on secular subjects. There is scarcely a more inspiring or nobler ballad in the English language than her *Siege of Derry.* I say this although my sympathies are not on the side which the ballad represents: assuredly, had I been alive in 1689, I should have joined my kinsmen in shouldering a musket or trailing a pike for King James. But as we can admire courage even in a foe, so we can admire ability in a literary opponent. The successful defence of the "Maiden on the Hill" through a siege of 112 days was certainly a glorious one, and it deserves to be sung as Cecil Frances Alexander has sung it. I shall let her be represented here by that noble piece which appeared at first anonymously in the *Dublin University Magazine* in 1856, and of which Tennyson said that it was one of the few poems by a living author that he would care to have written. It is entitled:

The Burial of Moses.

By Nebo's lonely mountain, on this side Jordan's wave,
In a vale, in the land of Moab, there lies a lonely grave;
And no man knows that sepulchre, and no man saw it e'er;
For the angels of God upturned the sod, and laid the dead man there.

That was the grandest funeral that ever passed on earth;
But no man heard the trampling, or saw the train go forth—
Noiselessly, as the Daylight comes back when Night is done,
And the crimson streak on ocean's cheek grows into the great sun,

Noiselessly, as the spring-time her crown of verdure weaves,
And all the trees on all the hills open their thousand leaves;
So, without sound of music, or voice of them that wept,
Silently down from the mountain's crown, the great procession swept.

Perchance the bald old eagle, on gray Beth-Peor's height,
Out of his lonely eyrie, looked on the wondrous sight;
Perchance the lion stalking still shuns that hallowed spot,
For beast and bird have seen and heard that which man knoweth not!

But when the Warrior dieth, his comrades in the war,
With arms reversed and muffled drum, follow his funeral car;
They show the banners taken, they tell his battles won,
And after him lead his masterless steed, while peals the minute-gun.

Amid the noblest of the land we lay the Sage to rest,
And give the Bard an honoured place, with costly marble drest,—
In the great minster transept, where lights like glories fall,
And the organ rings, and the sweet choir sings, along the emblazoned wall.

This was the truest warrior that ever buckled sword;
This the most gifted poet that ever breathed a word;
And never earth's philosopher traced with his golden pen,
On the deathless page, truths half so sage as he wrote down for men.

And had he not high honour,—the hill-side for a pall?
To lie in state, while angels wait, with stars for tapers tall?
And the dark rock-pines, like tossing plumes, over his bier to wave!
And God's own hand, in that lonely land, to lay him in the grave!

In that strange grave without a name,—whence his uncoffined clay
Shall break again, O wondrous thought! before the judgment day,
And stand, with glory wrapt around, on the hills he never trod,
And speak of the strife that won our life, with the incarnate Son of God.

O lonely grave in Moab's land! O dark Beth-Peor's hill!
Speak to these curious hearts of ours, and teach them to be still.
God hath his mysteries of grace, ways that we cannot tell;
He hides them deep, like the hidden sleep of him he loved so well.

Now, it may naturally be asked, where is that sparkling wit, that sprightly humour, for which the Irish race is supposed to be so peculiarly noted? I answer that it is largely absent from

the poetry composed in Ireland between 1800 and 1850, and I think that the circumstances mentioned in my introduction are sufficient explanation. It did bloom, somewhat exotically, among the Irishmen who wrote poetry in England for English consumption. With them it is by turns bright and flashing, and keenly satirical and incisive, as anyone will perceive who turns to the *Odoherty* papers contributed by William Maginn (1793-1842) to *Blackwood's Magazine,* or to his various parodies and *jeux d'esprit* to be found in *Fraser's Magazine* from its establishment in 1830 onward; or to the even more versatile and witty things which Francis Sylvester Mahony (1804-1866), either as Father Prout or Oliver Yorke, published in *Fraser's Magazine* from 1834 to 1836. It must be remembered, however, that the piece by which Mahony is universally known, namely *The Shandon Bells,* is rather of the gently pathetic and reflective than of the humorous order. Its humorous element is derived from the fact that Father Prout quizzically accuses Moore of having plagiarized from it in his *Evening Bells.* In places the quaint rhyme-scheme may also be held to add a slightly humorous tinge; but the whole piece is, to my mind, suspiciously closer to tears than to laughter.

THE SHANDON BELLS.

With deep affection
And recollection,
I often think of
  Those Shandon bells,
Whose sounds so wild would,
In the days of childhood,
Fling round my cradle
  Their magic spells.
On this I ponder
Where'er I wander,
And thus grow fonder,
  Sweet Cork, of thee;
With thy bells of Shandon,
That sound so grand on
The pleasant waters
  Of the river Lee.

I've heard bells chiming,
Full many a clime in,
Tolling sublime in
  Cathedral shrine;
While at a glib rate,
Brass tongues would vibrate—
But all their music
  Spoke nought like thine;
For memory dwelling
On each proud swelling
Of the belfry knelling
  Its bold notes free,
Made the bells of Shandon
Sound far more grand on
The pleasant waters
  Of the river Lee.

I've heard bells tolling
Old "Adrian's Mole" in,
Their thunder rolling
  From the Vatican;
And cymbals glorious
Swinging uproarious
In the gorgeous turrets
  Of Notre Dame.
But thy sounds were sweeter
Than the dome of Peter
Flings o'er the Tiber,
  Pealing solemnly—
O the bells of Shandon
Sound far more grand on
The pleasant waters
  Of the river Lee.

There's a bell in Moscow,
While on tower and kiosk O,
In Saint Sophia
  The Turkman gets;
And loud in air
Calls men to prayer,

From the tapering summits
  Of tall minarets.
Such empty phantom
I freely grant them;
But there is an anthem
  More dear to me—
'Tis the bells of Shandon,
That sound so grand on
The pleasant waters
  Of the river Lee.

There was much humorous work produced in Ireland during this period, but it was mostly in the shape of prose fiction: if I mention the names of William Carleton (1794-1869), Samuel Lover (1797-1868), and Charles James Lever (1806-1872), it will be sufficient indication of what I mean. All these three wrote poetry, as well as prose. Lover indeed was a many-sided genius: painter, poet, novelist, dramatist, musical composer. Some of his poetry is exquisitely pathetic. Some of it is deliciously humorous, such as *Molly Carew, Widow Machree, The Low-backed Car, The Whistlin' Thief, I'm not Myself at all!, Rory O'More,* and

BARNEY O'HEA.

Now let me alone, though I know you won't,
  Impudent Barney O'Hea!
  It makes me outrageous
  When you're so contagious,
And you'd better look out for the stout Corney Creagh;
  For he is the boy
  That believes I'm his joy,
So you'd better behave yourself, Barney O'Hea!
  Impudent Barney,
  None of your blarney,
  Impudent Barney O'Hea!

I hope you're not going to Bandon Fair,
For indeed I'm not wanting to meet you there,
  Impudent Barney O'Hea!

For Corney's at Cork,
And my brother's at work,
And my mother sits spinning at home all the day,
So no one will be there
Of poor me to take care,
So I hope you won't follow me, Barney O'Hea!
Impudent Barney,
None of your blarney,
Impudent Barney O'Hea!

But as I was walking up Bandon Street,
Just who do you think that myself should meet,
But impudent Barney O'Hea!
He said I looked killin'
I called him a villain
And bid him that minute get out of the way.
He said I was joking,
And grinned so provoking,
I couldn't help laughing at Barney O'Hea!
Impudent Barney,
None of your blarney,
Impudent Barney O'Hea!

He knew 'twas all right when he saw me smile,
For he was the rogue up to ev'ry wile,
Impudent Barney O'Hea!
He coaxed me to choose him,
For if I'd refuse him
He swore he'd kill Corney the very next day;
So, for fear 'twould go further,
And just to save murther,
I think I must marry that madcap, O'Hea!
Bothering Barney,
'Tis he has the blarney
To make a girl Mistress O'Hea.

Lever's novels are bubbling over with high animal spirits and are packed full of humorous situations and dialogue, and even if he is not always quite fair to certain classes of his fellow-countrymen, we are disposed to forgive him because he

has provided us with such a fund of inextinguishable laughter. He was not much of a poet, but he has introduced into his novels some gay and rollicking songs which are in keeping with his prose. *The Man for Galway* and *The Widow Malone* may be mentioned as samples.

* * *

One word by way of postscript. When Charles Gavan Duffy (1816-1903) emigrated in disgust and despair in 1856, he said that there was no more hope for Ireland than for a corpse on the dissecting table. Luckily he was a bad diagnostician, and he lived long enough to realise it and be glad. Ireland has recovered from her lethargy. She has renewed her youth. She is pulsing with life, bounding with activity. In a thousand ways she is voicing the new feelings. Not the least remarkable of the phenomena which the future historian will have to recognise and chronicle, and, if possible, explain, is the wonderful literary revival that took place in Ireland towards the end of the nineteenth century and has continued in apparently unabated vigour down to this day. It is one of many symptoms that give cause for hope that Newman's prophecy may yet be fulfilled.

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CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE KNOWABLENESS OF GOD.

Agnosticism is one of those terms, which, unfortunately, are used in a variety of different meanings. The task of distinguishing these meanings and defining the term in the sense in which it is used is one that we should gladly dispense with. It is, however, absolutely necessary that we should distinguish and define, if we are to avoid confusion, and misunderstanding. In a very large sense of the word, Agnosticism means doubt or skepticism. It is the attitude of exaggerated caution in reference to theories, explanations and inferences, the unwillingness to go beyond the facts of the case, as the saying is. It is a state of mind that we find very often among scientists, and among those who affect the scientific attitude. It is a very praiseworthy quality of mind, if kept within the limits of moderation and reason, and, when kept within those limits, has no quarrel with Catholic philosophy nor Catholic philosophy with it.

More specifically Agnosticism is the doctrine that certain things commonly supposed to be knowable are really not knowable at all. It is a conviction, in this case, as well as an attitude of mind. And this kind is, again, twofold. There is philosophical Agnosticism, which, distinguishing between appearances and the underlying reality, holds that appearances alone are knowable, and that the underlying reality cannot be known by the human mind. Agnostics call the appearances *phenomena,* and the reality back of them the *noumenon.* Thus, if one were to ask you whether you knew what gold is, you would probably not hesitate to answer in the affirmative. The philosophical agnostic, however, would bid you hesitate before you answer so confidently. He would have you consider that gold has some surface qualities which we all know, yellow color, a high degree of malleability, the power to resist acids, and so forth. These

are appearances, or phenomena. And, when you study gold in the laboratory, or when you investigate the question of its distribution in the mineral world, or inquire into the manner of its occurrence in nature, or study its economic and commercial uses, you are adding to your knowledge of the phenomena. There is, indeed, an underlying something, the essence of gold, the ancients called it, the noumenon as it is called by more recent thinkers; but this is unknown to you and must remain unknown and unknowable. You do not really know then *what* gold is, though you know a good deal *about* it. This is the doctrine of Kant, with which, happily, we are not immediately concerned here and now, except to mark it off from theological agnosticism, to which it bears a striking resemblance, and to which, indeed, it is very closely related.

Theological agnosticism is a derivation from the doctrine just described. From Kant to Hamilton, from Hamilton to Mansel, from Mansel to Huxley and Spencer—this is the line of descent of contemporary theological Agnosticism. To Huxley we owe the name, to Mansel the first explicit formulation of the doctrine. It was Mansel who in his lecture "The Limits of Religious Thought" (1858) formulated the doctrine that God is unknowable, or rather, that human reason cannot attain a knowledge of "the being and attributes of God." For Mansel was not an Agnostic at all in the later sense of the word. He believed that revelation is necessary because of the shortcomings of human reason and because of our inability to know God by natural reason or moral conscience. Spencer and Huxley, of course, made no such qualification. Their agnosticism was complete and thoroughgoing. It was not an attempt to protect revealed religion against the attacks of philosophy. It was, on the contrary, an indirect attack on revealed religion, a vindication of the materialistic method as the only scientific method of interpreting the Universe. Spencer, especially, contends that science and religion are coördinate; that each has its own separate sphere; that the sphere of science is what is known, while the sphere of religion is that which, though present in consciousness, yet transcends human knowledge. Each, he says,

interprets reality in its own way, and the only reconciliation possible is on the principle that they deal ultimately with the same unknowable. This is agnosticism as the term is popularly understood, a doctrine which relegates God and all religious truth to the realm of the unknowable. This agnosticism does not deny God; it is not atheism. It affirms that God exists, but affirms also that He is unknown and unknowable.

The reason why agnosticism as an attitude towards religious truth has met with so widespread a response in modern times is neither logical nor theological. It is, rather, psychological. Agnosticism appeals to many minds because, in an age that is busy with a multitude of material concerns and material cares, there are many minds that shirk the obligation of serious thinking. We experience something of the kind, occasionally, in ourselves. When we are tired, mentally, and seek respite from work in the company of our friends, we sometimes meet with a dialectician or a doctrinaire who seeks to engage us in argument or discussion. Do we not often seek an easy way out by answering, "Oh, I know nothing about it?" The profession of ignorance, real or assumed, is a subterfuge, an evasion, an attempt to escape the business of thinking. Is not agnosticism often a similar device? The age is weary with much thinking about matters of science and government and the material conduct of life. The clash of warring sects has occupied the field of religious thought, and has added to the world's weariness of much discussion. No wonder that there should be some who, as the line of least resistance, follow the profession of agnosticism and proclaim somewhat flippantly their despair of knowing anything.

Catholic philosophy takes up the argument against philosophical agnosticism first, on the ground of the absurdity of such an idea as that of the unknown God. A God who is not known is a contradiction in terms. For by the word *God* is understood not merely a *deus philosophicus*, an abstract, or an ultimate scientific concept, but a Being who is the object of human love, adoration, worship and reverence, a Being to whom prayer may be addressed and sacrifice offered up. A God about

whom we know nothing might as well not exist, so far as these acts of service and devotion are concerned. There is, indeed, a worthless legend to the effect that Aristotle prayed "Cause of Causes, have mercy on us." Such a prayer is an absurdity, and Aristotle could not have been so unreasonable as to utter it! No one can pray to anything but a person, no one can offer sacrifice to anything but a person. And, since, all down the ages, the name *God* has been used to designate the object of prayer and sacrifice, the Agnostic may well be accused of inconsistency when he uses the term in an illogical context. But, whatever name he use, the Agnostic is debarred from talking about the unknown God as the ultimate of Religion. The unknown may, conceivably, be the object of science or of philosophy, but never of religion, since religion consists essentially in acts that imply a knowledge on our part of the object of those acts. The Agnostic, of course, will say "You *think* you have a knowledge of God; but you have not." To which the answer is, "If you convince me that I cannot in any sense, know God, I must cease to worship Him, and, for me He is no longer the ultimate religious, nor, indeed, anything religious at all."

The next point that Catholic philosophy makes is this. The Agnostic inevitably contradicts himself. It is well enough in theory to distinguish between existence and nature, and say that, while we are convinced of the existence of God, we can know nothing of the nature of God. But, it is a distinction that cannot be maintained very long. When you say *that* God exists, you surely must know something about *what* He is. Spencer has no sooner told us that we can know nothing about God than he straightway speaks of God as the power behind nature, "the power," as he says, "manifesting itself in phenomena." This, as anyone can see, is, virtually to concede the position of the theist. For, if God manifests Himself in phenomena, then He is knowable, at least imperfectly, by means of those manifestations. The Agnostic contradicts himself because human nature is more powerful than the logic of his position. And it is not merely the fact that he falls into

self-contradiction that we emphasize. We emphasize also the circumstance that he does so invariably, and, as it were necessarily, thus unconsciously revealing the intrinsic weakness of his position.

If, now, we turn to the grounds on which Agnosticism rests, we are in a position to deal more philosophically with the Agnostic. In general, the nature of the human mind, and of knowledge, is made the foundation of the conviction that God is unknowable. Now, the human mind is a wide field of enquiry, and the nature of human knowledge is a complicated problem. There are, thus, many avenues to Agnosticism, devious paths of psychology along which the Agnostic wends his way. The great highroad, however, is the doctrine that our knowledge does not put us into contact with reality either in science or in theology. Our concepts are not representations: they are merely symbols. We can attain such knowledge of reality as a blind man has of colors, or a deaf man of sounds, but we cannot reach any knowledge worthy of the name. There is a wealth of contradiction here. It is true that some of our concepts are merely symbolical. For instance, a man's concept of the greatest depth of the ocean. He expresses that concept in the words "five miles," but he has no power of definitely representing the depth of the ocean by means of a picture in his mind. Nevertheless, his symbolical concept is true: it is a state of mind that is correct, so far as it goes. It is not erroneous, although it is imperfect. And it may be made less imperfect by continued effort to fill in the symbol, and make it a representation. Because, then, some of our concepts are mere symbols, it does not follow that all of them are. And because some of our knowledge is symbolical it does not follow that even that kind of knowledge is erroneous. Imperfect knowledge is not false knowledge, so long as we remember that it is imperfect, and do not act as if it were perfect and adequate.

It would be a tedious task to pick out all the misunderstandings, confusions and contradictions in the Agnostic attempt to show from the nature of the human mind that a knowledge of

God is impossible. There are, however, three favorite phrases of the Agnostic which it will, I think, repay us to examine in detail. They are: first, "All knowledge is relative," second, "To know is to condition," and third "A knowable God is no God."

The assertion that "All knowledge is relative" is true in a sense. It is because it is true in one sense, or in several senses, and false in another sense that it is dangerous. The same may be said of many of the utterances of the Agnostic. If he were altogether in the wrong, and if there were not even a grain of truth in his contentions he could easily be left to his own devices. Because he is partly right, and because what he says is generally true in part, he finds favor with those who are not able to discriminate between a partial truth and a truth pure and simple. Let the phrase "All knowledge is relative" serve as an example. Our knowledge *is* relative. It is relative to our powers of knowing. If we had a mind more richly endowed we should, undoubtedly, know more than we do. If we had six senses instead of five we should, perhaps, be able to perceive directly some of the qualities of material things which, in our present condition, we know only indirectly, by their effects. By the sense of sight we are made aware directly of the colors of bodies. If we had a sixth sense we might just as easily be aware, for instance, of the current in an electric wire, or we might perceive directly the different rays, Roentgen rays, cathode rays, or whatever one wishes to call them. With our actual endowment of understanding and reason we discover many laws of nature; were we endowed with a wider understanding and a more vigorous power of reasoning we should certainly discover other and perhaps more fundamental truths about the world around us. Knowledge is, consequently, relative to our powers of knowing. Knowledge is also relative to our opportunities of knowing. Nature and human nature reveal themselves to us by their qualities and activities. If they revealed themselves more fully, we should know them more adequately. This is true of the knowledge which we obtain of our neighbor's character. There are, as you know, persons

whom one may meet day after day without ever coming to know them. Such persons are reticent and reserved. They are cautious and even mysterious about the most trivial things that concern themselves; they are non-committal on politics and even on that apparently impersonal topic, the weather. There are others who err in the opposite direction, who reveal themselves too easily, who, on the first or second occasion that we met them, tell us all about themselves. Both types are, of course, exceptions. They serve, however, to illustrate the point. Nature yields up the truth about herself freely and generously to him who takes the trouble to study. But, if she were more generous, and yielded up the secrets of science more freely we should know the hidden truths of nature more perfectly. Knowledge is relative to our opportunities of knowing. Thirdly, knowledge is relative in the sense that we know only those things which are brought somehow into relation with us. It is possible, for example, that somewhere outside the visible universe there is a beautiful constellation that has never yet sent its rays of light as far as us. If by force of gravitation it were visibly or noticeably to influence the course of other heavenly bodies which we do see, and whose path we observe, then the astronomer could tell that it exists and could tell, perhaps, something about its dimensions and its distance. But, if, even in this indirect way, it has never come into relation with us, we cannot know anything about it. For us it is, we say, non-existent. The truth is that it may exist and yet we may know nothing about it, because it has not come into relation with us in any way.

It is undeniable, therefore, that knowledge is relative to our powers of knowing, to our opportunities of knowing, and in a third sense it is relative in so far as the object, in order to be known, must somehow be related to us directly or indirectly. But this is not what the Agnostic means by relativity. He maintains that we know only the relations of things, not the things themselves. We do not know the flower, we know the color and the fragrance of the flower; we do not know the sun, we know only the light and heat and other rela-

tions of the sun to us. Now this assertion, it seems to us, is absolutely false. We do know the flower, we do know the sun. We know the flower in so far as it has color and fragrance; we know the sun in so far as it affects us by its light and heat. In other words, the relation of the thing to us is not the *term* of our knowledge, though it is the *measure* of our knowledge. Permit me to illustrate once more from our knowledge of human nature. You may know your neighbor only by appearance, never having spoken to him nor heard the sound of his voice. You know his height, you can guess his weight, you know his manner of walk, his gestures, his habits of dress, and so forth. Or you may know him by his voice merely, having heard him talk on the telephone, let us say, but never having seen him. In either case it is correct to say that you know the man's appearance, or the man's voice. But, it is also correct to say that you know him, although the measure of your knowledge is the man's appearance or the man's voice, as the case may be. "We know only the relations of things" is one assertion. "We know the related things, but only in so far as they are related to us" is another assertion. One may, perhaps, think that there is only a negligible difference between them. On the contrary, there is a vast and an enormously important difference. If it is true that we know only the relation of things to us, not the things themselves, then the Agnostic is right; we cannot know anything about God. If, on the other hand, it is true that we know the related things, the theist is right: we can know God in the measure in which He has manifested Himself to us in nature and in history. And our knowledge of God is not especially untrustworthy or unsatisfactory; for it is in the same way that we know anything which we do know. That is the actual human method of knowing, and, if we do not know God because that method is inadequate, then we do not know anything at all.

The second maxim of the Agnostic is "To know is to condition: therefore, since God is the Absolute, the Unconditioned, He is unknowable." Let us not be detained by the statement that God is the Absolute. Fortunately, we are not obliged to

go into the rather abstruse question of the nature of the Absolute, except so far as to say that the Agnostic and the idealist, when they talk about the Absolute are like a painter who with great ceremony and elaborateness of preparation, sets up his canvas, gets out his brushes, mixes his paints, and then finds that he cannot proceed with his work because the subject he has chosen—Nothing—has neither color nor outline nor any other determination. The first part of the argument, "To know is to condition" claims our attention here. It is an assertion which has not even the dangerous advantage of being partly true. It seems to me to be plausible only because it is vague. "To know is to condition," if it means anything, must mean that the act of knowing places real conditions on the object known. And that is in no sense true. The fact that you see an object or hear it, or know it in any other way implies a change in you, but makes no difference to the object seen or heard or known. The English have a saying to the effect that "The cat can look at the king." We may imagine that it makes a world of difference to the cat; the glimpse of royalty may change his whole career as a cat; it may brighten his outlook on life; it will, at least, give him something to tell his companions about, something to remember all the rest of his life. But, the point of the proverb is this: it makes no difference to the king. To be looked at, to be seen, to be known, implies no real change in the object of our vision or our knowledge, but only on the part of the subject. "To know is to condition," therefore, is a phrase which, in spite of its formidably technical sound, is simply false.

We come next to the third, and most popular maxim of Agnosticism: "A knowable God is no God." And at this point the Agnostic can afford, he thinks, to assume an attitude. The theist, he says, especially the theologian, belittles his God by claiming to know what He is. How can the finite compass the Infinite? he asks. How can our minds so prone to error and to illusion dare to comprehend a Being Whose immensity exceeds all the visible universe? The container must be at least as great as the contained, and the Boundless cannot dwell within the

confines of mind that is hemmed in by a thousand limitations. In this way the Agnostic seems to read a lesson in reverence to the theist and to place himself with the prophets and the psalmist whose business it is to exalt the sublimity and infinity of God. There is here, however, a very elementary misunderstanding. If we claimed to have an adequate knowledge of God, if we imagined that we can comprehend His infinite perfection, or define His greatness or any of His other attributes, the indictment would be just, and the guilt of the Christian theologian would be evident. But, the theist does nothing of the kind. He is the first to proclaim the inadequacy of his knowledge of divine things. "We know in part and we see only in part" is a fundamental truth for the theologian and for the Christian philosopher. A God whom we could adequately comprehend would, indeed, be finite, and, therefore, no God at all. This was freely admitted by the greatest of Christian thinkers long before Agnosticism was heard of. St. Augustine says, "Our thoughts are inadequate to express the nature of God, and our language is inadequate to convey our thoughts about Him," and St. Thomas of Aquin, "We are like little children, lisping a language which we do not understand," when we talk of God and divine truth. This form of intellectual humility, this modesty of mind, was more common among the schoolmen than the Agnostics seem to imagine. Aristotle, their master, was often quoted as saying that the mind of man in the presence of the highest truths is like the eye of the owl dazzled by the noonday sun.

There is, indeed, what may be called a Christian Agnosticism, an Agnosticism inspired, not by the despair of knowing anything about God, but by a deep reverence for the sublime greatness of God and a candid recognition of the limits of human knowledge. God is a Pure Spirit, an Immaterial Substance, a Power, a Force, a Personality, infinite, eternal, unchangeable. Our mind is fettered by material conditions, hampered by restrictions of time and place; our span of life, the whole cycle of human experience, is a period all too brief for the study of a subject inexhaustible. In a word, the Infinite, of its very

nature, eludes the effort of the finite mind to understand it adequately, or, as we say, to comprehend it. Our knowledge, therefore, of the infinite, and our manner of expressing it are both imperfect. We may think about God and speak about God in negative terms. Thus, we may contrast His Nature with that of the gross material world around us and say that He is immaterial or incorporeal. We may compare the immutability of God with the ever-changing flux of phenomena in the physical world and say that He is unchangeable. We may consider that, while forces and substances in our experience begin and end, and are conditioned by time and space, He is eternal and above all the limitations of time and space. We may compare with the imperfections, the shortcomings, the vicissitudes of other things, the absolute perfection of God, His lack of limitations, His freedom from defect, and therefore, call Him Infinite. Immaterial, incorporeal, changeless, eternal and infinite —these are terms which, as we understand them, are negative. We may, besides, proceed in a positive way to follow the analogical method and thus add affirmative assertions to our statements about God. We may liken Him to the ruler who is responsible for the conduct of affairs in a group or community, and call Him the Ruler of the Universe. We may have in mind the dependence of a piece of work on the agent who produced it, and, ascribing to God the production of created nature, we may call Him the Author of the universe. We may think of Him as looking forward to His creatures' wants, supplying our daily needs, as a thoughtful parent does, and in this analogy we call Him the Provider of the Universe, or Divine Providence. But, most reliable and most philosophical of all our ways of knowing God is the so-called way of causation.

It is a principle of common sense as well as of philosophy that every effect is like its cause. Of course, there will occur at once to our minds a multitude of apparent instances to the contrary. What resemblance is there between a piece of coal and the light in an electric lamp, although one is in a very true sense the cause of the other? What similarity is there between the decaying matter at the roots of a rose-tree and the

delicate colors of the bloom, though every rosegrower knows that the one is an indispensable cause of the other? These difficulties arise from the fact that cause and effect in nature and in our experience are mingled in very great complexity, and no one effect can be assigned to one single cause. Let us take an example from human anture. There are many forces and influences that go to form the character of a man. Among them one force, one influence, is certainly education, and "Like master, like pupil" is an adage that has truth as well as antiquity in its favor. But, would it be fair to judge that because the pupil is dishonest or untruthful or bad-tempered, that, therefore, his teacher possesses these undesirable qualities? By no means, because, our common sense tells us, the pupil may have "got" these faults from some other influence, inheritance, perhaps, or "evil communications," or bad example, or from reading bad literature. But, if these faults are due to the influence of his teacher, then, of course, we shall look for the same faults in the teacher. The principle must be understood in this sense "Every effect is like its cause in so far as it depends on that cause." It will be unlike it in so far as it depends on other causes. If now, our reason compels us to admit that this whole universe has a cause, one cause from which all things depend, then reason also compels us to admit that from a knowledge of the universe we can learn something of the perfection of its Creator. To the poetic mind especially, that is to the mind sensitive to esthetic values, the world is an open book in which the soul may read the story of God's perfections. There, especially, where man has not marred by sin and folly the beauty of God's handiwork, in the vast regions of interstellar space, in the immensity of the ocean, in the majesty of the storm, in the solemn beauty of the forest, in the multiplicity and regularity of color and design in plant life, in the marvelous instincts of animals, a mind like Ruskin's can discern transcriptions of the divine attribtutes. And in human nature itself, especially in the study of aggregate human nature in history, if one resist the impulse to be cynical and pessimistic, one may see not only the intervention of Providence

in the crises of human affairs, but also the ever-brooding presence of God in prevalent prosperity and the constant though slow and reluctant progress towards better things. Oh, one needs at times a robust confidence. There are those things in human history that try one's faith in God. But, robust confidence is needed everywhere. It is needed by the scientist, lest he become discouraged. It is needed by the teacher lest he give way to faintheartedness. It is needed by the idealist and the reformer lest he be overcome by the difficulties that beset him or listen to the voice of the friend who would restrain him. With confidence in the triumph of right and the gradual advance of enlightenment, one may find God in history as well as in nature, and learn to know Him.

Such knowledge of God as we glean from nature and from history will necessarily be imperfect. There remains another source, our own conscious life, the world of our own thoughts and feelings and emotions and sentiments. For some Christian philosophers this is the most abundant and the most reliable fountain of knowledge. This was true of St. Augustine; it was true of the great mystics, and it is true of many minds to whom mysticism and theology are closed books. There are many men who are introspective by native endowment, to whom physical science does not appeal at all, and history hardly at all. They live the adage that "the proper study of mankind is man." For them the way to God is the interior way, the path of self-study and self-knowledge. If the busy world would only let them stop to think, if the cares and interests of life would only cease to occupy them, they could learn more by quiet thought than by much reading. Their minds may need the stimulus of another mind like Plato's, or St. Augustine's, or Pascal's, or Emerson's, or Newman's, or the incidental reflective line is some minor poem; but once the line of thought is started it goes on to its term, God, a knowledge of whom, as the mystics taught, is indispensable to us if we are to know ourselves.

When, however, all these ways of knowing God are taken into account, it remains that our knowledge of God is imperfect.

We agree, then, with the Agnostic in acknowledging the inadequacy of our knowledge of God. But we differ with him in several important respects. First, our knowledge, though imperfect, is not, therefore, erroneous. If we realize its limitations we may rely on it. Our powers of mind may be "weak"; they are not on that account "deceitful," so long as we are aware of the weakness. There are very few things that we know completely; yet our knowledge of most of them is considered reliable. The Agnostic demands too much; he is like the man who would insist that one should drink every drop of water in the Atlantic before one could say that it is salt. In the second place, while we freely grant that our knowledge of God has limitations, we hold that beyond those limits is the region of Faith, not the region of Nescience. Reason lights our path up to a certain point; beyond that there is darkness, says the Agnostic; beyond it, says the Christian philosopher, our way is lighted by the torch of revelation. What we know about God is, after all, comparatively little: what we believe about Him adds very much to what we know. Instead, therefore, of the Agnostic despair of knowing anything, we have the Christian hope of adding to our knowledge by Faith.

And here, let me emphasize one aspect of Faith as a source of knowledge. Some one has said that religion is the metaphysics of the multitude. It is, in so far as it takes the place of a metaphysics which the multitude could never attain. There are few who have an aptitude for philosophical thinking, especially for that kind of thinking which requires long discipline, protracted application, profound concentration. It is not easy for us to rise above the conditions of bodily existence; and, as few of us can attain the self-abnegation of the saints, so too, few of us can attain the wisdom of the greatest philosophers. Our bodies, as Plato taught, hinder our souls. They make it easy for us to think of material things and difficult to think of spiritual things, at least, to think of them in that unusually obstinate way that is characteristic of metaphysicians. Faith, consequently, takes pity, as it were, on the weakness of our condition. It makes allowance for our propensity to think of

things in terms of the material and the corporeal. It presents God and divine truth in the imagery of the senses. It uses pictorial representations in canvas and in stone; it has recourse to the allegory, the parable, the descriptive vision which uses words as its art-material; it appeals to our sense of harmony, inviting us to lay hold of the Infinite by means of the most spiritual of the arts; finally, by putting before us the examples of the saints, it leads us to a knowledge of the divine attributes by a means which, following Ruskin, we may call transcription of those attributes in human nature. Rites and ceremonies, Catholics believe, have an efficacy of a special kind. We are not concerned here with that aspect of them. They have also an educational value, and with that we are concerned. The Church, we think, does well to deal with man as he really is, a creature of sense and sentiment as well as a creature of intellect and reason. It is, we believe, an inestimable advantage to have the senses and the sentiments appealed to, and to have them aid intellect and reason in the quest for a knowledge of God.

But, such a method leads to a false idea of God, the Agnostic contends. It leads to anthropomorphism. Let us examine how much truth there is in the contention, and see if it damages the case of the Catholic philosopher who makes Faith aid Reason. First, let us see if we understand what anthropomorphism means. Of course, it means literally the error or mistake of ascribing to God a human appearance. In this crude form it occurred among many primitive peoples and among some who were highly civilized. Among the Greeks, for example, this error vitiated all the popular conception of the deity. It was against this mistake that Xenophanes, almost at the dawn of philosophical reflection, composed his invective which breathes the fiery spirit of the Hebrew prophecies. "Each man," he said, "paints the gods as he himself is, the Ethiopian as black-faced, and snub-nosed, the Thracian as fair-haired and blue-eyed, and if horses and oxen could paint, they would, no doubt, represent the gods as horses and oxen." This is, I need hardly say, the crudest kind of anthropomorphism

and characteristic of a primitive stage of civilization. There is, in the next place, a less crude form of the same error when human ways of thinking, human thoughts and human sentiments are attributed to the Deity. This, I say, is less crude. It is, on that account, more subtle and insidious, and, as a fault, difficult to eradicate especially from the undisciplined mind. Many a Christian moralist, and many a theologian has been betrayed into it. The man who is by nature narrow and severe, who is straight-laced and unduly strict in his ideas of propriety, inevitably reads these qualities into his idea of the Deity, and paints God as a rigid, almost a merciless taskmaster. Such a man will live under the Old Testament and not under the New. His God is the God of Sinai, not Jesus of Nazareth, a God of wrath, not a God of love. This anthropomorphism is, in a measure, unavoidable. If we know that it is only a *manner* of speaking, or at most, a *manner* of thinking, we realize that it is not misleading.

Let us take as an illustration our habits of speech in general, and our way of thinking about the soul, in particular. We use many phrases and forms of speech which we know to be false in the literal sense. The sun does not really "rise," the moon does not really "set," the stars do not move in their silent journey round the earth; but we preserve these modes of speech because they are established. The wind does not "sigh," the valley does not "smile," the sun does not "shed" its radiance, the sea does not "spread" before us, the sky does not form a blue dome above us; still we say these things, and language would be robbed of much of its picturesqueness if we were obliged to discontinue saying them. Especially, when we speak of the soul and its activities we have to borrow material phrases which we know to be literally inapplicable. We use the words "high" and "low," as if the soul had dimensions or direction: "high-minded," "low-minded," "high" ambition, "low" aims. We talk of hot and cold, as if the soul had temperature; "hot" anger, "cold" calculation. We talk of dark and light conditions of soul, as if the soul had color or were visible: a "dark" thought, a "bright" mind, a "bright" disposition.

We talk even of "heavy" and "light," as if the soul could be weighed in a scale or balance. Now, we know that none of these terms are strictly applicable to the soul, and yet we use them, not merely because they are picturesque or vivid, or because the use of them has been sanctioned by custom, but mostly because, although we know that the soul is immaterial and incorporeal, we cannot help thinking of it in terms of matter and material qualities. Try and realise this peculiarity of our nature. You know that your soul is a spirit, and yet you cannot keep thinking of it for more than a minute without finding that you are thinking of it in terms of body, and you can hardly talk about it for two minutes without apparently ascribing bodily qualities to it. If you were a spirit, and only a spirit; I mean, if you had no body, you could, of course, think of your soul as a spirit. But, while we are in these bodies of ours, these habitations of clay, in which the soul, so the Platonists think, is imprisoned, we must clothe our thoughts in material images and express them in words that have primarily a material meaning. And no harm is done, so long as we *know* that the soul is a spirt.

The same is true of our effort to think about God and to express our thoughts about Him. It is always wise to recognise one's limitations. We should recognise frankly that we are creatures of earth as well as of heaven, and that, if we know spirtual truths and speak of them we must expect to find in our knowledge and in our language the influence of matter as well as of mind, of body as well as of soul. We should not be afraid of using sense-images when thinking of God, so long as we know that He is above the sense-world. We should not be afraid of speaking of Him in language that is inadequate, so long as we know that it is inadequate. We should not be deterred by the fear of anthropomorphism from trying to increase our knowledge of God. To learn more about Him is the all-absorbing task of the mystic and the saint. To learn something at least, and to increase that something is the duty of everyone who believes that there is a God. To hold that such knowledge is possible is the privilege of Christian philosophy.

And here, as elsewhere, philosophy has much for which to thank revelation. Faith in God, as organized and institutionalised in the Churches adds to our knowledge of God in many ways. Most of all has the oldest of the churches done signal service to philosophy by admitting frankly and fearlessly the peculiarity of our nature as beings partly material and partly immaterial. She has maintained against all criticism and amid a great deal of misrepresentation the value of rites and ceremonies. She has justified these on the ground that they appeal to the senses, and that it is through the senses, after all, that knowledge enters the soul. She knows that there is danger of superstition, since the grossly material mind may and does cling to the material symbol and miss the spiritual meaning. She knows that the ignorant and sensual mind will misunderstand and misuse the rite or ceremony and miss its true efficacy. But, she is not deterred by fear of superstition, because she knows that superstition may be held in check. She knows the danger of anthropomorphism; yet she uses pictures and statues, painted or sculptured symbols of spiritual realities; she even allows within limits representations of the Infinite Himself. She sanctions or tolerates a whole mass of popular literature about God and the saints, which speaks of spiritual things in language that is very human. She does this knowing that there is a remedy for the abuse of all these, while the use of them brings God and divine things home to many minds that would otherwise fail to grasp any spiritual truth at all. For this she has been misunderstood, and sometimes, it would seem, misrepresented. But, like all great teachers she accepts this as her portion and inheritance, the price that she pays for the right to bring spiritual truth down, so to speak, to the minds of the lowly. The fear of idolatry is founded on a distrust of human nature. So is this other fear of which we have been speaking. A great and a historic institution can afford to trust human nature and to trust itself.

Let me remind you once more of the fundamentals in this discussion. Catholic philosophy claims that Faith aids Reason. At the same time, it contends that the two are distinct. Reason

has its rights and rational philosophy has the privilege, as has all the other sciences, of using its own method. In the use of that method the Catholic philosopher borrows nothing from the Church, the Bible or any source of authority. He discusses the knowableness of God, just as a Protestant, a Jew, or even a Saracen might discuss it, from the standpoint of reason. He meets the Agnostic on common ground, and, as I say, takes no advantage of him in the matter of method. Face to face, and sword-blade to sword-blade (if a discussion on so sublime a problem may be so described), the Catholic philosopher meets the Agnostic. His weapon and his armor are reason and rational principles. The contest is a fair one, so far as these are concerned. But the Catholic philosopher is also a believer. When he is not arguing but meditating; when he has laid aside the weapons of controversy and is thinking out his problems for himself, we contend he ought to bring his faith to the aid of his reason. The philosopher and the believer are not two persons, but one. His logic is not for weekdays and his faith for Sunday use. It is a fatal mistake to separate the two. When reason has discovered all that it can discover about the nature and attributes of God, is it not natural for the reasoner to turn to revelation and supplement his knowledge by borrowing from that source? The demand for "more light," in this case, is not the cry of the rationalist but of the believer who turns to the light shed from above, not exactly the light of Divine Grace in which the mystic sees all things as in a golden evening twilight, but rather the clear white light that revelation vouchsafed to all. It is a light like that of reason itself, satisfying where reason disappoints, sustaining where reason fails, confirming, encouraging and inspiring reason in its own actvities. In this way reason is aided by faith in its effort to know God.

William Turner.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York, Robert Appleton Company.

The fifteenth volume of *The Catholic Encyclopedia* brings to a close this monumental work. The promises made to the public when this work was undertaken have been more than fulfilled. The highest hopes of the friends and wellwishers of the *Encyclopedia* have been abundantly realized in all things pertaining to the character and magnitude of the work, but it will be a long time, even under the most favorable circumstances, before the work will produce the full fruitage of which it is capable. A multitude of teachers and preachers and writers must acquaint themselves with the resources which it offers and grow accustomed to turn to these splendid volumes for authentic information on all things Catholic.

The history of education from a Catholic standpoint has not yet been written, but the teachers of this subject in our normal schools will find in the articles scattered throughout the *Encyclopedia* a wealth of material on every phase of the subject. For example, under the article *Universities* in Vol. xv there will be found an admirable introduction to a study of universities and university education under the following five subdivisions: Origin and Organization, Academic Work and Development, Renaissance and Reformation, Modern Period, and Catholic Action. After a study of this article the reader will turn with profit to the history of the principal Catholic foundations which have been treated in separate articles. In this way the *Encyclopedia* offers a very extensive history of the rise and development of universities in the Middle Ages and of the notable Catholic universities of the present and of the past. Moreover, as each of these articles is provided with an extensive bibliography, the key is placed in the reader's hands by which he may gain access to everything worth while that has been written on the subject.

In a similar way, the teachers of general history and of church history will find in the *Encyclopedia* a wealth of authentic infor-

mation on practically every topic that they will be called upon to treat in their classes. There is nothing more deadening than to confine thought to the narrow limits of the text-book. The teacher cannot hold the respect of his pupils or maintain their interest if he has no other source to draw upon than the text-book that is in their hands. The *Encyclopedia* will be of incalculable benefit to the zealous teacher. It offers a well-balanced treatment of the various topics under appropriate heads and it supplies the bibliography which makes it possible for the teacher to follow up the subject to any extent which may seem desirable.

There is much more harm done to the developing minds of our children and youths by the assumption that the modern world owes its development in science and inventions to the unbeliever than by explicit misstatements of historical facts or gross calumnies against the rulers of the Church. Glaring falsehoods serve as a challenge which drives the Catholic to seek out the truth and to defend himself, but the quiet assumption disarms him and undermines his faith; for this there is but one remedy, we must make our young people familiar with the glorious fact that the great discoverers and men of science have been, for the most part, practical Catholics who found not only that the Catholic Church did not oppose their progress but offered them help and guidance in the pursuit of truth. In the lives of such discoverers as Copernicus, Kepler, Spalanzani, Schwann, Van Beneden, Muller, Pasteur the youth will find the best antidote for many of the evil tendencies of our times. The *Encyclopedia,* moreover, will help to bring home to everyone, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, some realization of the all-important role which the Catholic Church has played in the development of our civilization. Painting, sculpture, architecture, music, letters, mathematics, science,—whatever has tended to lift man up from earth towards heaven, whatever has tended to chain the flesh and to free the spirit of man, has come out of the bosom of the Church. In the Church the teacher will find concreted the great fundamental principles of education; here he will be enabled to trace the marvelous work that the Church has accomplished in domesticating supernatural truth in the lives of men and in rendering it fruitful in shaping their actions.

The non-Catholic who is anxious to learn the attitude of the Church on a question that is at present calling forth so much

earnest endeavor from many non-Catholic bodies, will turn with pleasure and profit to the article entitled *Union of Christendom* from the pen of Sydney F. Smith. From this he will learn with what interest Catholics view the present movement and how sympathetic they are towards it, but he will also learn the uncompromising principles that have governed the Church's attitude in the past and that will doubtless continue to govern it in the future. However desirable the union of Christendom may be, the Church can not purchase it by the sacrifice of principles or by the minimizing of truths of which she is the divinely appointed guardian.

We are expending on our schools vast sums of money annually for buildings, equipment, and teachers. The burden at times is very heavy, but it is the worst kind of economy to fail to provide that which is essential to the effective working of the school. It has often been said that it is not the building or the equipment but the teacher that makes the school. However true this may be, it is well to remember that no teacher has within himself a perennial source of information; he must rely upon his library for daily mental food no less than for inspiration and enthusiasm. A good working library is often an expensive thing quite beyond the reach of the faculties of some of our schools. In such cases the *Encyclopedia* may well take the place of a library. There is sufficient information on almost every theme which should occupy the teachers in our Catholic schools within the covers of these fifteen volumes and where the supply of information may be short on any given subject the bibliography furnished will enable the teacher to borrow or procure the few books needed. Where the means provided for library purposes are more ample, it goes without saying that the *Catholic Encyclopedia* should be considered indispensable.

It is the duty of every Catholic to assist in destroying error and in spreading the light of truth. This may be done in many ways: from the pulpit, through the press, in conversation, but there is no more effective way available than by having the *Catholic Encyclopedia* in every public library where fair-minded men and women may be given an opportunity to learn the truth about a multitude of things Catholic. If the Catholics in any village or town would interest themselves in the matter, they would find it an easy matter to render this service to themselves and to the Church no less than to their non-Catholic fellow citizens. If the library in question

depends entirely on donations for its books, the Catholics might club together and present a set of the *Encyclopedia* to the reading room.

The value of the *Encyclopedia* would be considerably enhanced for many a teacher and student if courses of reading were mapped out on various subjects. One might be interested in looking up the biographies of the notable Catholic men of science, but not knowing their names would find it some little task to search them out in the pages of the *Encyclopedia*. Again, the teacher who had only Protestant histories of education at hand might not know what articles to turn to to find the Catholic viewpoint and to learn of the work done by Catholic institutions and Catholic individuals. What is true of these subjects is equally true of many others. The non-Catholic who is examining the Church with a view of entering the fold would be benefitted by pursuing systematic courses of reading in the *Encyclopedia,* but some guidance is necessary in order that the best results may be achieved with the least expenditure of time and energy.

The Index volume will doubtless go a long way toward meeting the needs of those who use the *Encyclopedia*.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique, sous la Direction de A. D'Alès. Fascicule VIII. Paris, C. Beauchesne, 1912.

The eighth fascicule of the new Apologetic Dictionary is a praiseworthy continuation of this very useful and interesting work. It offers the reader no less than twenty-two articles, all of them of general interest and of scientific merit.

The first article, *Church Government,* by Father G. Neyron, professor in the University of Beirut, is a skilful justification of the strongly centralized authority exercised by the Holy See, based on grounds of reasonableness and equity. The Abbé E. Tobac, professor in the Theological Seminary of Mechlin, devotes ten pages to the careful study of grace on the basis of scriptural evidence, which he examines under four heads,—the Old Testament, the Synoptic Gospels, the Pauline Epistles, and the Johannine writings.

The Assumptionist, Father M. Jugie, professor in the scholasticate of Kadi-Keui, Constantinople, has a valuable article of twenty-five pages on the *Greek Schismatic Church*. After a survey of the four great groups into which this church is divided, the Greek proper, the Greco-Arabian, the Slavic, and the Roumenian, he gives a history of the Greek Schism, in which the causes leading to this lamentable separation are carefully noted. He then sets forth the differences in doctrine and ritual which help to keep the Greek Church aloof from the Church of the West, dwells on the narrowness and bitterness that characterizes the polemics of the Greeks and Russians when dealing with the Church of Rome, and suggests the proper apologetic method of meeting their prejudices and objections. The most interesting part of this long article is the section, seven pages long, in which the author sedulously notes the points in doctrine, ritual and discipline, in which the Greek Church is in disagreement with the Latin. These divergencies are more numerous than is ordinarily thought. Thus, in the last century, the Russian Church adopted the view that the deutero-canonical books are not inspired. This view is now held also by a large number of the Orthodox Greeks. In the Ecumenical Patriarchate, centered in Constantinople, the recognized grounds for divorce with the privilege of remarriage are, besides adultery, abortion procured by the wife, chronic insanity, incurable contagious disease, absence without consent for the period of three years, a change of religion after marriage, even to Catholicism, banishment for conspiracy aginst the established form of government, conviction of an infamous crime. The article has by way of supplement a rich bibliography.

Father J. Huby, S. J., has an erudite article of eleven pages on the *Religions of Pagan Greece*. He could have made it more complete, however, by telling in a few sentences of the ancient Greek belief in a future life in heaven as a reward for the just. Dr. Van der Elst is the author of three related articles, *Miraculous Cures*, *Hypnotism*, and *Hysteria*, in which he shows that there are extraordinary cures obtained through prayer for which suggestion in any of its forms fails to give the adequate explanation. To the subject, *Man*, four contributions are devoted. The first, by the editor, Abbé d'Alès, treats of man according to the teachings of Genesis. The second, on *Prehistoric Man*, is the joint contribution of three writers, the Abbé H. Breuil, professor in the School

of Anthropology, Paris, and the two brothers, also priests, A. and J. Bouyssonie. In this learned article of fifteen pages, the story of primitive man is told with a freedom of treatment not generally found in Catholic works dealing with this difficult subject. A large amount of information, neatly and clearly arranged, including the valuable data afforded by recent discoveries, has been compressed into this article. It is thoroughly up-to-date. The third contribution is an able exposition of the scientific proofs for the unity of origin of the various races of men. The author is the well-known Sulpician, Abbé J. Guibert, superior of the Seminary attached to the Catholic University of Paris. The fourth and last contribution is by Teilhard de Chardin, who treats of man according to the teachings of the Church and the conclusions of sound scientific philosophy. The Abbé H. Dehove, professor in the University of Lille, has a solid article of fourteen pages on *Idealism*. The subject of *Immanence* is treated at even greater length. The article on the *Philosophic Doctrine of Immanence,* by Father A. Vanensin, S. J., is followed by a long double article on the *Method of Immanence,* with particular reference to the system of M. Blondel. The exposition of the subject is given by Abbé Albert Vanensin, the critical examination of its worth is confided to Father Valensin, S. J. The other articles in this fascicule are *Halley's Comet,* by Father J. Stein, S. J., the articles on *Heresy* and *Ecclesiastical Immunity* by Father L. Choupin, S. J., the question of the *Safe-conduct of John Hus,* by Father A. Kroess, of Innsbruck, and the unfinished article of the Abbé J. Besson on *Cremation,* the last part of which is reserved for the next issue.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Commentaire Français Littéral de la Somme Théologique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Par R. P. Thomas Pègues. T. VII, *Les Passions et Les Habitus.* Toulouse, Edouard Privat, 14 Rue des Arts: Paris, Pierre Tèqui, 82 Rue Bonaparte.

The preceding volumes of this luminous translation and commentary have been noticed in the *Bulletin* (see May, 1912). The seventh volume deals with thirty-four questions of the *Prima Secundae,* (Qq. xxii-lv), containing St. Thomas' treatise on the Passions and Habits. Nowhere perhaps is there to be found such

a patient and complete analysis of the acts of the human mind and heart as that given by the Angelic Doctor. Scholastic philosophers did not have all the advantages enjoyed by men who devote themselves nowadays to experimental psychology. We do not expect to find in their writings that wealth of information about brain-action, nerve centres and the like, which modern writers supply in superabundance, and in a language more puzzling, alas, to the unitiated than the terminology of thirteenth century authors. But they studied and analyzed the hearts of men, giving to the world a rational psychology which will always remain true and up-to-date because human nature will be ever substantially the same as it has been. That in constructing their system they did not neglect experiment and analysis is evident from their writings. St. Thomas devotes twenty-eight questions (xxii-xlix), with an average of four articles in each question, to the study of the passions. He treats them as a moralist, ethically rather than psychologically, but the true interpretation of the moral law presupposes a knowledge of human nature. The passions come under the laws of morality in so far as they can be controlled by reason: merely as acts of the sensitive faculty they are common to men and brutes. In modern works on psychology the word *passion* is restricted to violent emotions: what the scholastics called passions modern writers designate as *feeling, sentiment, emotions, mental states,* etc., etc. (See Maher, S. J., *Psychology, Empirical and Rational,* pp. 221, 425, 426). The schoolmen applied the term (*passiones*) to all acts of the sensitive appetency (*appetitus sensitivi*), and divided them into two classes, the *passiones partis concupiscibilis,* having for their direct object something which is apprehended as agreeable or repugnant in itself, and the *passiones partis irascibilis,* whose object is apprehended under some condition of difficulty or danger. In the former there are six passions, or rather pairs of passions: joy (or delight) and sadness; desire and aversion (or abhorrency), love and hatred. In the latter five are enumerated: hope and despair, courage and fear, and anger. All of these St. Thomas analyzes with remarkable skill and patience, condescending, *e. g.,* to explain why it is that hope abounds in the young and those who are stimulated by strong drink (Qu. xl., a. 6). The reading of his treatise will be rewarded by a clearer insight into the workings of human nature.

To habits in general he devotes six Questions (xlix-lv), which

are of great value both for the psychologist and for the moralist. An acquired habit has been well called a second nature, and this truth must be constantly in the minds of all who are laboring for the uplift of mankind. In the training of youth, for instance, nothing is so important as the formation of good habits. This fact is considered by all intelligent educators and criminologists: it is best known by those who deal most intimately with the souls of men, the priests of the Catholic Church. Although St. Thomas wrote principally as a theologian, his treatise abounds in natural psychology, and it furnishes a solid philosophical foundation for the tracts that are to follow dealing with the Virtues and Vices.

D. J. KENNEDY, O. P.

Le Problème du Salut des Infidèles. Essai Historique. Louis Caperan. Beauchesne, Paris, 1912. Pp. vii + 112.

Le Problème du Salut des Infideles. Essai Theologique. Louis Caperan. Beauchesne, Paris, 1912. Pp. x + 550.

1. The call of all men to salvation everywhere and always is clearly indicated in the Scriptures, old and new. The universality of the Redemption is thus undeniable, though to share in the fruits of Calvary a religious knowledge is necessary. Had the ancient pagans the requisite knowledge? The early apologists declared that the pagans existing before the Gospel had come into actual contact with the revelation of Israel, and had even enjoyed revelations of their own, as for instance in the Sibyline prophecies. This reply of the apologists of Celsus and Porphyry effectively disposed of the charge that Christianity, of set purpose, excluded all pagan antiquity from salvation. The Alexandrians, notably Clement and Origen, went further still in their views, imagining that Christ had descended into Hell for the express purpose of preaching the Gospel to the dead and making converts. But this theory of "a second chance" was plainly at variance with the accepted principle that the time of trial and probation was over at death, and consequently this strange idea of the evangelization of the dead quickly disappeared from the thought of the Eastern Church, never having secured a foothold in the Latin West. It remained for Protestant-

ism to revive the idea in recent years, in a vain attempt to broaden the un-Christian narrowness of the doctrines of the reform.

With Saint Augustine the problem changes from an apologetic to a theological point of view, largely owing to the need of refuting the contention of the Pelagians that those who lived before Christ were saved *without* Him. Saint Augustine promptly refuted this heretical statement which did away with the necessity and universality of the Redemption, and reduced Christianity to the mere force of moral example. He maintained against these heretical simplifiers of Christian truth the objective reality and value of the Redemption, bringing out into salient relief the central principle that faith in Christ is necessary for salvation to those who lived before the Gospel, as well as to those who came after. Times have changed, he said, not faith. Accordingly the bishop of Hippo emphasized his doctrine of the necessity and gratuitousness of grace, refusing to recognize in the pagans of antiquity any virtues really availing for salvation,—a statement which the reformers later forced out of its context and exaggerated to their bitter cost.

Not so the Schoolmen, of whom Saint Thomas was easily the prince. Instead of taking the words of Augustine to the letter, they rather considered the great Christian thought he was trying to express against the innovators of his time. This was his insistence on the necessity of faith in Christ as necessary for salvation. Saint John Chrysostom had expressed the opinion that faith in the true God was sufficient to save the Gentiles of olden time. The Schoolmen reconciled both statements in the theory of the sufficiency of implicit faith in the world's redeemer. Saint Thomas held that faith in the Mediator is necessary for salvation since the Fall. But he also pointed out that belief in God the Rewarder is implicit faith in Christ the Mediator, since it is only through Him that men obtain their reward. This belief is supernatural in its object; it is in fact an obscure, veiled, remote faith in the incarnation and the Christian mysteries. Through this obscure belief, under the motions of grace, the savage of the forest and the otherwise benighted heathen could make an act of faith and be saved, God doing His part, if they did theirs, either by an interior inspiration, a special revelation, or the sending of a missionary. This theory of implicit faith, which Saint Thomas so well developed, sacrificed no essential of the Augustinian position, but merely gave it a larger perspective, in which the uncovenanted mercies of God

could be seen at work in heathendom, penetrating the darkness with the rays of faith and grace, preventing that "tragic fate of the heathen," upon which the so-called reformers were to descant later, apparently with much gusto. It is to the credit of scholasticism that it thought out this high and noble concept of the providential bounty of God, without having any apologetic interest to safeguard save that of the noble Catholic tradition which had been handed down. It was in no spirit of subtlety or concession, but simply as a natural development of the thought of Saint Augustine, that this generous doctrine had come to be recognized. There was a baptism of desire, as well as one of water and of blood. "Facienti quod in se est (ex gratia), Deus non denegat gratiam.

This classic solution of the problem might have spared the Catholic apologists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries much labored explanation, when the discovery of America and its hosts of unevangelized Indians gave a concrete and vivid turn to the question of heathen salvation. The fear of the Jansenist and Protestant uproar seems to have held them back from a whole-hearted acceptance of the scholastic theory, but only for a while. Caught between the two fires of Jansenists on the one hand, and sceptics like Rousseau and Voltaire on the other, the apologists contented themselves with the supposition that a limbo for adults existed as well as for infants, and to this the Indians were consigned. Protestant theology, with its ideas on predestination, free will, and justification maintained that the whole mass of Indians were damned. But in 1772, F. X. de Feller, a doctor of the Sorbonne, published a reply to Voltaire in eighty-six pages, in the course of which he clearly stated the theory of the sufficiency of implicit faith, according to the Indians that possibility of salvation which the early apologists of Christianity and the Schoolmen had not refused to the ancient pagan world. The classic theory thus won its way again into recognition, although the theologians of the sixteenth century acted for all the world as if it was a new class of Pelagians, and not the poor American Indians, with which they were confronted. It was the texts of Saint Augustine, rather than the Indian question, which inspired the pessimism of their utterances and the evasive character of their proposed solutions. Later, traditionalism came to disturb the serenity of the classic position, but nothing could stand in the way of its final acceptance. The scholastic revival and the Leonine encyclical on the spread of

devotion to the Sacred Heart completed its triumphant re-entry into Catholic thought.

The foregoing affords but a meagre account of this excellent volume, packed with erudition, good sense, sound Catholic principles, and sympathetic criticism. It is the first time, to the reviewer's knowledge, that this important subject has been historically investigated, and we congratulate the author on the success of his labors, and most especially on the manner in which he has done justice to the five dogmas involved. It was no easy task. We are also glad to see that the author maintains the absolute priority of predestination to any human causes of the same, and that he does not fail to add correctives to principles that have been somewhat loosely employed in the stress of controversy. The reviewer confesses to laying down the volume with a distinct sense of indebtedness to the author for having brought all this converging material together into a scientific whole, and the hope is ventured that many will profit by a careful reading of this volume, which we can sincerely assure them beforehand, will repay their study and interest. Too bad that Sabatier had not lived to read it. He would have seen the unscholarliness of his charge that the tragic fate of pagan peoples is a necessary consequence of the exclusiveness of the Christian religion. In a journalistic age like the present, when sources are neglected and information obtained at second-hand, a volume such as this silences the scoffer and lets him see the depths of his misinformation. We could say much more, but the economy of space forbids further comment.

2. The second volume is a detailed exposition of the theological theories mentioned in the first, and a criticism of them from the standpoint of Catholic principles. These theories are three in number, the author rejecting the first two and defending the third. Two additional chapters follow on the act of faith necessary for the salvation of the infidel and on the extraordinary means of salvation.

The author dismisses the theory of the evangelization of the dead as in contradiction with the biology of grace, and without serious scriptural or traditional foundation. The theory of the admission of the pagans to Limbo is likewise dismissed as an unfounded speculation. Man has only a supernatural end, and consequently a middle state like Limbo can exist only for infants

or irresponsible persons, these being the only exceptions in favor of which the theory of a natural beatitude may be invoked. And then again, if God invites all infidels to salvation, as He does, it is vain to suppose that He will aid them by His grace to make but half the return journey to Him. A half-way solution is out of question, at variance as it is with the constant tradition of the Fathers and the theologians. There remains therefore only the doctrine of the universal offer of supernatural salvation. The grace of Christ is not withheld from the pagans; that proposition has been condemned more than once. The condition on which the fulfilment of the divine promise depends is the non-opposition of the pagan to the entrance and action of grace in his soul. There can be no question of any positive disposing of one's self for grace. Grace effects the disposition if there be no obstacle to its working. The famous "Facienti quod in se est, etc." is the result of grace, and not a disposition positively leading to its concession. All the theoretical antinomies disappear, if we admit with Saint Thomas that, while grace is gratuitous and cannot be merited, it is conceded to all. The pagan in his first real moral awakening finds the grace of God knocking at the door of his heart. The real domain of the Church is not co-extensive with its visible possessions, such as those which a geographical chart exhibits; it extends beyond all such boundaries.

The faith that saves the Pagan is an assent to revealed truths, an assent which is explicit on the elementary dogmas, but which may be implicit on the others. Explicit adhesion to a minimum of truths is therefore necesary as a means of salvation. The pagan must believe in God as a pupil believes in the master teaching him. No vague faith in God, gathered from the spectacle of nature, will save the pagan, and such is not the faith which God offers him. And what is the object of the pagan's faith? It is the remunerating Providence of God, "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." The faith of the pagan called to justification rests on the same motive as the faith of the Christian. The whole difference is in the number of truths necessary to be believed.

Out of the Church there is no salvation, it is true, but then a man may belong to the Church at heart, and so his belonging to the visible communion of Christ is accomplished in desire, if not in full reality. All grace in the present divine economy is given

as an attractive force towards the Church, and it is this bond of implicit faith which unites all souls in good disposition. Primitive tradition, if it has not perished, may furnish the pagan with the idea of God the Rewarder. Interior inspiration may make good the lack of preaching. And then there is always that supernatural Providence of God dispensing the favors of grace to the souls of those who sit in darkness. "Deus non alligavit sacramentis potentiam suam."

We need only say of this second volume that it is a fit companion to the first in every way. The history of the reduction of the supernatural truths necessary for pagan salvation, to a minimum, shows how much needed the scholastic revival was, as all this doctrine was clearly announced in the Middle Ages, circumstances contributing to obscure it later in the minds of those who had the defense of Christianity at heart. It is good to refresh our souls once more at the olden founts. We wish these two volumes the widespread recognition which they deserve.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

The Science of Logic. P. Coffey. In two volumes. Vol. I. Longmans, Green and Co., London and New York, 1912. Pp. xx + 445.

The aim of this treatise is, "in the first place, to present in a simpler way the Principles of the Traditional Logic expounded by Aristotle and his scholastic interpreters; secondly, to show how the philosophical teachings of Aristotle and the Schoolmen contain the true basis for modern methods of scientific investigation, inductive no less than deductive; and finally, to extend, rather than supplement the traditional body of logical doctrine by applying the latter to some logical problems raised in more recent times." The first volume deals with conception, judgment and inference; the treatment of the inductive process being reserved for a second volume.

Although the author "is quite unconscious of having said or intended anything new or original," he has none the less made a noteworthy contribution to the literature of a subject which is of fundamental importance in the Scholastic and in every other sys-

tem. Whatever view be taken of the Scholastic methods, it must be admitted that they were logical; and one of the best means of appreciating them rightly is to understand the principles of logic on which they are based. The Schoolmen at any rate were not afraid to let the "dry bones" of their reasoning stick out at every point—an exposure which is wisely avoided in arguments where there are no bones beneath the tissue of words.

The present work, however, is not merely an exposition of the traditional logic. In each chapter one finds a recognition and a careful discussion of modern theories. Special attention, naturally, is given to English writers on logic; but the leading authors in other countries receive due notice and criticism. It is satisfactory and encouraging to see that both in the foot-notes and in the bibliographies which close each chapter, the references are accurately given—a detail of technique which is sometimes overlooked in publications that are supposed to widen out the student's acquaintance with the literature.

Through a happy combination of the old and the new, Dr. Coffey has succeeded in giving a very complete treatment of each topic: his account of the syllogism occupies about one hundred pages and abounds in illustrations drawn from various sources other than the classic. This fulness will be helpful to the student who desires something more than the condensed statement usually offered in manuals of logic. The teacher, in particular, will find in this work many useful suggestions both for his own handling of the subject and for the guidance of his students in their collateral reading. As the author indicates in his preface, the advanced portions, printed in smaller type, may be omitted by the beginner and the remaining portions may be used as a text-book. A list of questions and answers subjoined to the volume enhances its utility for class-room purposes. With the practical training which is thus provided and with a diligent study of the text, both the graduate and the undergraduate student will be enabled to discern "the suggestive and illuminating truths which may be gathered from a serious analysis of the thinking processes of the human mind."

E. A. Pace.

Jérusalem: Recherches de topographie, d'archéologie et d'histoire. Tome premier, Jérusalem antique par le Père Hugues Vincent, O. P. de l'École biblique. Tome second, Jérusalem nouvelle par les PP. F. M. Abel et H. Vincent, O. P. de l'École biblique. Ouvrage publié avec le concours de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. Fascicule premier. Librairie Victor Lecoffre, J. Gabalda, Editeur, Paris, France.

In the standard work of Introduction which has enjoyed successively the patronage of Popes Leo XIII and Pius X, at first in its unabridged and then in several editions of its more compendious form, Fr. Cornely, S. J., writes: "Saeculi xix initio . . . vix ulla invenitur aetas sterilior, quum omnibus in disciplinis theologicis tum maxime in studiis scripturisticis." (Ed. 1894, I, 724.) Troublous times were the cause. "Postquam autem Ecclesiae et mundo pax est reddita, una cum aliis disciplinis theologicis etiam exegesis resuscitata est, neque desunt *germina,* quae laetos jam ejus fructus *promittunt.*" (Hagen's Cornely, ed., VII, 1911, p. 172.)

On the appearance of the first fascicle of "Jérusalem," it is fitting to observe that exegesis is dependent on a large group of allied sciences for a substructure, and that without these it is doomed to be tottering, warped, untrue in a thousand details and lifeless. It was the Marquis de Vogüé who first conceived the happy idea of cultivating the study of Sacred Scripture and cognate branches in a way that has proved helpful in infusing into biblical pursuits their pristine vigor and making them a living issue in our day as they were in the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries. The idea was to found a Biblical school at Jerusalem and the project was carried out by the Dominican Fathers.

De Vogüé's original and authoritative investigations on the "Temple de Salomon," "Églises de Terre Sainte," Semitic epigraphy, Byzantine architecture in central Syria, etc., showed what prodigious results might be achieved in a brief space in these unexplored and fairly unknown regions. The day was welcomed when the quest of Palestinian lore drew men of competence from the comforts of Western life to search out and to control the treasures long buried in a hallowed but forgotten soil.

What the Dominicans began, the Americans and Germans imitated, and quite recently the Holy Father, at the suggestion of

Rev. Fr. Fonck, S. J., Director of the Biblical Institute at Rome, endorsed the movement by consenting to the establishment of a second Catholic Biblical school in the Holy City. The Jesuit Fathers will be in possession and there is no room for doubting that with their abundant resources of mind and sinew, so skilfully operating through a world-wide and compelling propaganda, the work to be undertaken will in due time assume proportions worthy of the cause, and will, like that of their predecessors in the field, redound to the glory of the Church and the progress of Catholic science.

Up to the present, "Jérusalem" is the latest of a long series of publications that have imparted to the Dominican School of St. Stephen a singular superiority and prestige. The "Études Bibliques," one of the latest accessions to which is Dr. Buzy's "Introduction aux Paraboles Évangéliques"—a study approved by the Biblical Commission as the author's dissertation for the Doctorate in Sacred Scripture,—furnishes an insight into the comprehensive and daily enlarging scope of the work to be done, in outline, principle, materials, theory and application. The parallel series, "Études palestiniennes et orientales," though only in its infancy, seems destined to equal success since it answers to a distinct need. The "Revue Biblique," now in its twenty-second year, is continuing to appear with the express permission of the Holy See; while other enterprises contributing to our knowledge of the Bible, its history, its lands and peoples are pressed forward as often as discovery, invention or pecuniary aid makes it possible to open up new spheres of activity or to winnow afresh the old.

"Jérusalem" is a natural outgrowth of "Canaan d'après l'exploration récente." The latter work was also written by P. H. Vincent, and was the result of ten years of intelligent conscientious observation and clear-sighted research. The first volume of the more recent enterprise, "Jerusalem antique," will picture faithfully the exact rôle enacted by the Holy City in national and religious development from the earliest times till its destruction by Titus, A. D. 70; the second, "Jérusalem nouvelle," will carry the subject from the triumph of the Romans down to our day. The study of the Christian sanctuaries, the harrassing vicissitudes through which the city has passed under Roman, Moslem and Crusader will be among the chief themes.

The first fascicle of tome I, now available, contains a general

introduction largely topographical. Its contents are clearly and masterfully presented, richly illustrated, and abound in a variety of Oriental data both critical and illuminating.

The first and second fascicles of tome II are promised for spring, and thus the fascicles are to alternate from volume to volume until the entire work of 1,500 pages, 4to., besides 150 exquisite plates, will have been produced.

The project, as conceived, is highly original and unifying; and the reputation of its authors, not less than the matter treated, forbids any doubt as to its future rank among the classics of Palestinian science. Its authority is guaranteed in advance by the concurrence of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. No synthesis of the kind has been possible until late years, and a synthesis it will be, even though studded with monographs, if its leading author is spared to direct the enterprise to completion.

THOMAS À KEMPIS REILLY, O. P.

Part of the Opus Tertium of Roger Bacon, including a Fragment now printed for the first time. Edited by A. G. Little. Aberdeen: the University Press, 1912. Pp. xlviii + 92.

Some four years ago Professor Pierre Duhem of the University of Bordeaux published the most important Roger Bacon discovery that has been made in recent years under the title *Un fragment inédit de l'Opus Tertium de Roger Bacon* (Quaracchi, 1909, in 8vo., pp. 197). In his study on this fragment—which was hidden in a MS. in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris—Prof. Duhem pointed out that there still remained a gap between the end of the fragment of the *Opus Tertium* edited by Brewer and the beginning of the fragment discovered by himself. This missing portion has since been discovered by Mr. A. G. Little in a MS. at Winchester College and it is printed on pp. 1-19 of the present volume for the first time. The remainder of the treatise here published corresponds in the main with the fragment edited by Prof. Duhem. Among the most interesting passages of the new fragment that Mr. Little has now brought to light, is that in which Bacon defends the study of magic and urges the Pope

to regulate it (pp. 17-18). It may also be noted that Bacon's explanation of the alchemical terms for metals agrees with that which Chaucer puts into the month of the "Chanouns Yeman."

The text of the present edition is based on the Winchester College MS. 30, which has been compared with two other early MSS. and with Prof. Duhem's edition of the Paris MS., all the variants being carefully noted. It is good that Bacon's treatise should have found an Editor so eminently fitted for the task as Mr. Little, who has supplemented his really informing Introduction (pp. viii-xxx) with a Summary of the treatise in English (pp. xxxi-xlviii) which amounts in parts almost to a translation. For giving us the most complete text of the *Opus Tertium* yet published, Mr. Little has made all students of Bacon again his debtor. Our best thanks are also due to the British Society of Franciscan Studies for its share in the publication of the work before us which takes on additional interest in view of the near approach of the seventh centenary of Bacon's birth (1214-1914).

PASCHAL ROBINSON, O. F. M.

Out of Shadows into Light. Charles J. Callan, O. P. With an introduction by His Eminence James Cardinal Gibbons. John Murphy Company, Baltimore, Md. Pp. 96, dimensions 5¼ x 7½. 50 cents, net.

The purpose of this book is to give in concise, yet ample form the best and most reliable teaching on the happiness of Heaven. Of the benefits to be derived from works of this character every earnest Christian is aware. Reflection on life everlasting is not only a soothing balm to those that mourn the loss of loved ones and a support and solace amid the afflictions of life; it is also a powerful incentive to virtue and a strong bulwark against temptation. Father Callan's book is singularly adapted to these ends. It unites solid piety with doctrinal clearness and a charming grace of expression. Beginning with the motives that render reasonable our unflinching faith in the great beyond, the writer unfolds before our gaze the "Holy City, the New Jerusalem," as portrayed in

revelation. The beatific vision, in which God is seen face to face, the loving enjoyment of his eternal beauty, the glad companionship of the saints, the glorious endowments of the risen bodies are successively described. This little book is to be recommended as a solid and hard-reasoned, yet unctuous and beautiful exposition of a theme that every serious minded person should have always at heart.

J. A. McHugh.

MISCELLANEOUS.

An Appeal to Catholic Ladies for a National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception at the Catholic University, Washington, D. C.

The urgent need of a Church for the Catholic University has long been evident. Since its opening in 1889, new departments have been established from year to year, with the result that the students have increased to about five hundred, and the professors to sixty, with the certainty of a corresponding growth every year. A suitable Church therefore is very badly needed to hold the actual body of professors and students, and a reasonable number of visitors.

It is essential that among the public buildings of the University there should always be one, devoted to Our Divine Lord in the Sacrament of His Love, belonging formally to the whole University as such, open at all times to the piety and devotion of professors and students, likewise of the many visitors who daily make the rounds of the University grounds and buildings. In this Church the Holy Sacrifice would be offered up daily by the numerous priest students, for whose needs in this respect the capacity of Divinity Hall is about exhausted. Confessions would be heard regularly and with all due liturgical dignity. Our beautiful devotions would be carried out with a view to attracting the lay members of the University, particularly the undergraduate body, to whom the Church, it is hoped, would soon come to be their own particular and prized possession. For the daily life of the University no better religious influence could be imagined than a proper devotional center of prayer and adoration.

Almost every month of the scholastic year some great religious ceremony takes place at the University that calls for an attendance of several hundred persons. Thus the Solemn Opening and Closing of the academic year, the feasts of the Immaculate Conception, of the Conversion of St. Paul, of St. Thomas Aquinas, and other public ceremonies, like the two Solemn Masses annually said for our benefactors, living and deceased, bring together large bodies of worshippers, often persons of great prominence in the National

Capital, who in this way become better acquainted with the University and the noble ideals of the Catholic Church in all that pertains to the higher education of her children. Yearly also large ordinations of priests take place at the University, frequently of members of the seven religious orders located there, and for this purpose suitable sanctuary and sacristy spaces are badly needed, so that the Holy Orders of the Church may be conferred amid comfort and splendor, and with all due facilities of attendance on the part of the laity, to whom these ceremonies are peculiarly attractive.

Twice a year the Board of Trustees meets at the University, in the fall and spring. If we had a suitable church, occasion could be taken of the presence of so many venerable prelates to gather about them not only the entire University, but also the Catholic laity of Washington, amid the attractions of suitable liturgical services and all the devotional aids of our Catholic religious life.

When the Fathers of the Sixth Provincial Council of Baltimore, in the year 1846, placed the United States of America, which consisted then of only one ecclesiastical province, under the protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary conceived without sin, they laid upon American Catholics an obligation to show an especial devotion toward our Blessed Lady. No one could accuse American Catholics of falling behind Catholics of any other nation in their devotion to the Mother of God, but our being placed under her patronage in a special manner seems to imply that we should have not only the devotion which all good Catholics have toward the Blessed Virgin, but that we should show extraordinary devotion to her as *American* Catholics. For a long time it has been felt that there should be some National Monument, as an outward testimony of this devotion, and there can be no doubt that if such monument were erected the National Capital is the place for it. It has been suggested that this National Monument or testimony of American devotion toward the Immaculate Mother of God should take the form of a beautiful church at the Catholic University of America, to be known as the National Shrine of the Blessed Virgin.

For some time an attempt has been made to collect money for this good work and not without some fruit, but it has been felt that as the women of America purchased and endowed Mount Vernon, so the Catholic women of America should in a special manner promote the building of this National Shrine. For this

purpose a committee has been formed under the direction of the Rector of the Catholic University, who will transmit to him all offerings for this good work. The Catholic University, beneficiary of the piety of those who bestow their offerings toward the building of this Church, owes them naturally a debt of gratitude. In return, then, for the offerings made to the Shrine, two masses will be said every week; the first on Monday for all those who have contributed any amount whatever toward the building of the Shrine; the second for all those who collect contributions for this good work. When the Church is built it is hoped that a mass may be said every day for those who have in any way contributed toward it.

It is also the intention of the authorities of the Catholic University to enroll the names of all Collectors on parchment to be placed under the high altar. There can be no doubt that such a work as this needs only to be known to receive the approval and co-operation of every devout Catholic, and the committee who have undertaken this work confidently commit it to your prayers and pious co-operation.

All contributions may be sent to the committee appointed by the Rector of the Catholic University: Mrs. Burrall Hoffman, 58 East 79th Street, New York, or Miss Fannie Whelan, 1717 20th Street, Washington, D. C. They should be made payable to "The Catholic University of America," and will be duly acknowledged. Particular instructions will be furnished on application to either of the aforesaid committee.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN,
Rector of the Catholic University.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Meeting of the Board of Trustees. At the Meeting of the Board of Trustees held on Wednesday, April 9, the election of Very Reverend Charles F. Aiken to be Dean of the Faculty of Theology was approved. Dr. Patrick J. Lennox, Associate Professor of English, was advanced to the rank of Professor. The resignation of Dr. George Melville Bolling was read and accepted. The Right Reverend Rector was authorized to proceed with the building of a Dining Room for the lay students of the University. Gibbons Hall was erected into a University College, Very Reverend Doctor Spensley being appointed President of the New College and Father Tierney to take up, next scholastic year, the duties of President of Albert College.

Lectures by University Professors. Reverend Doctor Fox is delivering a course of six lectures on "Socialism and Social Reform from the ethical standpoint," under the auspices of the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences.

Painting for Gibbons' Memorial Hall. The Board of Trustees of the Catholic University of America has accepted the generous offer of Mr. John D. Crimmins, of New York City, to donate to the new Gibbons' Memorial Hall the famous painting of the last moments of Pope Leo XIII by the Marquise de Wentworth. The painting will be placed in the main hall of the building.

Editors of the Catholic Encyclopedia Honored. Through His Eminence, Cardinal Farley, Pope Pius X has bestowed upon each of the editors of the *Catholic Encyclopedia* the medal, "Pro Ecclesia et Pontifice"—a distinction conferred by the Holy See upon Catholics for distinguished service in behalf of the Church and its Head. It was first conferred by Pope Leo

XIII in 1888 upon certain Catholics in recognition of their efforts in behalf of his sacerdotal jubilee. The *Catholic Encyclopedia* is now complete and all English-speaking Catholics will be gratified by this evidence of the pleasure of the Sovereign Pontiff over the monumental achievement of the editors. Those who have merited this distinction are Charles G. Herbermann, Ph. D., LL. D.,; the Rt. Rev. Monsignor T. J. Shahan, D. D., the Rev. John J. Wynne, S. J., the Rev Edward A. Pace, D. D., and Condé B. Pallen, Ph. D., LL. D.